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ABSTRACT

This study challenges current historical assumptions about the nature, scope, and
timeframe of the 1641 Irish Rebellion in Kerry, Clare, and Limerick counties in western
Munster. Placing the start of the popular rebellion in these counties around 1 January 1642, the
beginning of unrest is set several months further back. In the process of analyzing the actions of
popular and organized rebels alike, the motivations for rebellion are characterized as political
and social rather than religious. In turn, seventeenth-century Irish society was transformed from
the traditional narrative of a rigid, religiously-divided society into something far more complex
and amorphous, with emphasis placed on the importance of local situations, in particular the
successes or failures of plantation policy and the existence of substantial Protestant populations.
Though the rebellion would later coalesce along confessional lines after the October 1642
Confederation of Kilkenny, the initial period of rebellion demonstrates that certain areas of
Ireland by 1641 had produced religiously heterogeneous societies that served to slightly soften
attitudes between rebels and their Protestant neighbors.

iii

INTRODUCTION
15 January 1642. Near the small town of Glanaroughty, in county Kerry, William
Seames was having a bad week. An English Protestant, Seames was an enterprising yeoman
farmer in the region; he loaned out cows, heifers, horses and cash to his neighbors – English and
Irish, Catholic and Protestant – as he and others had done for years in both the settler and native
communities. He had a wife, several children, and an extra lease outside of Glanaroughty which
he farmed apart from his own.1 By the night of the fifteenth that life, which Seames had hewn
for himself in the isolated southwest of Ireland, had been turned on its head by the rebellion
which would eventually affect the entire island, culminating in the Confederation of Kilkenny,
Catholic Ireland’s most formidable attempt at an independent government under the auspices of
the British monarch.
The trouble for Seames started three days prior on 12 January, when a small band of
rebels led by Fynnen McDermod and Donogh McFynnen, both native Irishmen, rose up in
rebellion in county Kerry, riding through the countryside and stealing whatever they could find;
they took cows, horses, and money from Seames and his debtors – even hides, hats, hat-bands,
and a book of accounts from Robert Sharde.2 Within the next few days—perhaps even hours—
news began reaching Seames from his neighbors and fellow farmers of the robberies that were
devastating the countryside. The cows and horses that had remained at his lease outside of
Glanaroughty had been taken. The goods and belongings of many Protestant settlers such as the
Burrell family, the local merchant Henry Coply, and the gentleman Thomas Dight had all been
pilfered by the McDermod and McFynnen gang. The economic relationships interwoven within
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Deposition of William Seames, (Trinity College of Dublin, Manuscript Series MS 828, fol. 198r-v).
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the isolated community crumbled as a result. When William Seames was asked in September
1643 by Phillip Bisse’s traveling commissioners to put down in writing his experience during the
rebellion, the first thing he recounted was the debts lost to him as a result of these robberies:
James and Samuel Burrell owed him £100; the merchant Henry Coply and John Bartholomew
were indebted to Seames; even the two principal rebels named by Seames were defaulting on
some sort of debt incurred to him. All of those named by Seames, owing by his estimation a
total of £487, were either “out in actual rebellion [or] utterly disenabled by means of this
rebellion. Therefore, this deponent can get no satisfaction from them.”3
Things took a decided turn for the worse for Seames on the fifteenth when McFynnen
and McDermod returned to the Glanaroughty area with a larger band of men, either in concert
with, or as a part of, Captain Sugan’s (Florence McFynnen MacCarthy) larger rebel force. Early
in the day, an errant shot was fired into James Burrell’s house by an unknown rebel, striking
Burrell’s wife Katherine and killing her. Later Seames, his wife, their children, and others
totaling what Seames estimated at 140 Protestants of all ages were stripped naked by the rebels.
When Seames demanded to know why he and British Protestant settlers in general were being
treated so roughly, Fynnen McDermod replied “that what they did they had the King’s hand and
seal for it.”4
The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, the British Civil Wars, or whichever way one typifies
the unrest of the late 1630s and 1640s in Britain was undoubtedly the “greatest concentration of
armed violence to take place in the recorded history of the islands of Britain and Ireland.”5
William Seames’ experience was not atypical of what many English Protestant settlers
3
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edited by John Kenyon and Jane H. Ohlmeyer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), xix.
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experienced during the early period of the rebellion in Ireland in late 1641 and through 1642.
Robberies and violence like those related by Seames led to a general, island-wide breakdown in
social order as Irish Catholics revolted against all people, places, and things English and
Protestant.
This breakdown, however, was by no means universal or uniform in the way it
manifested itself. With the original rising in Ulster, authority there was the first to erode;
popular unrest quickly spread to western Leinster as local Catholic lords gathered arms and men
to join the rebellion and the crown’s Protestant officials such as the Marquis of Ormond tried to
counter its spread. By spring 1642, in part due to the stalemate between Charles I and the
English Parliament, the rebellion had quickly reached every corner of the island and Catholics—
both Old English and Irish—were attacking English Protestant institutions and Protestants
themselves.
This initial period of the rebellion, from its outbreak on 22 October 1641 until the
Confederation of Kilkenny united the island’s Catholics under an alternative government in
October 1642, is commonly passed over in histories of the period with ominous allusions to the
“initial period of confusion and chaos.”6 Rebel forces in this period working toward the creation
of a Catholic Ireland are hard to define and even harder to differentiate from opportunistic
individuals interested only in robbing Protestants; rebel armies appropriating goods for the war
effort and bands of thieves are virtually indistinguishable in the historical record. This disorderly
period will be the focus of this study, primarily in the three westernmost counties of Munster:
Clare, Limerick, and Kerry. These were chosen for several reasons. First, western Munster is
understandably left out of most studies of the period. Most of the rebellion’s action takes place
6

Micheál Ó Siochrú, Confederate Ireland, 1642-1649, (Portland: Four Courts Press, Ltd., 1999), 11.
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in Ulster and Leinster; even the majority of important events in Munster occur in the east near
Leinster or around Waterford and Cork. The lack of focus on the area has led to its events being
described in sweeping generalizations, if mentioned at all. Furthermore, the depositions in
Munster are unique, as they were taken by a traveling commission headed by Phillip Bisse. Henry Jones,
the commission’s head, remained in Dublin where the depositions of the other three Irish provinces were
compiled from refugees who had entered Dublin hoping to find safe passage back to England.7 The Bisse
depositions examined here are the only accounts taken from British settlers who remained in their local
areas, and therefore have fewer embellishments than those taken by Jones for the other three

counties and the information the deponents give is more credible. Finally, although Nicholas
Canny has recently studied Tipperary, Waterford, and Cork exhaustively, eastern Munster has
largely been avoided.8
This study attempts to answer two questions; first, what happened in these counties
during this initial period of rebellion? While the rebellion’s most important events took place in
Ulster, Kilkenny and Dublin, conflicts occurred island-wide. Forces were raised in the name of
the rebellion by Catholic landowners and peasants alike and English Protestants were robbed and
murdered in every single county. Learning what occurred will not only add to the local histories
of western Munster, but by examining its farthest fringe in its earliest stage will also portray the
rebellion’s impressive reach and organization. The second question is broader and harder to
answer: What was Irish society like in the seventeenth century, and how was it affected by the
rebellion? Indeed, our only first-hand accounts of the rebellion, depositions from ordinary
7

Joseph Cope, England and the 1641 Irish Rebellion, (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2009), 34-36.
Canny’s article (“Religion, Politics, and the Irish Rising of 1641,” in Judith Devlin and Ronan Fanning, ed.,
Religion and Rebellion, (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1997), 40-70) specifically covers western
Leinster and Waterford, and the Youghal area in particular depth. He also covers Tipperary extensively and Cork as
well in his eighth chapter of Making Ireland British 1580-1650, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). He
touches on Limerick and draws only partial from Kerry and Clare. This study is largely designed to fill the gap he
has left.
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British Protestants, portray not only the events which occurred, but also give us clues about the
heterogeneous communities that resulted from approximately sixty years of active English
colonization and the nuanced relationships and attitudes which developed therein.
It is perhaps important now to also explain what this study is not designed to do. As the
three counties in Munster examined here are more isolated (Kerry and Clare, especially) and less
planted than their eastern counterparts, the conclusions drawn in this study should not necessarily
be extrapolated to Cork, Tipperary, or Waterford – much less the entire island. While recent
historical trends have shown that the political motivations and events of all of Charles I’s
dominions are interrelated and should be considered holistically (e.g., the conflict is increasingly
called the ‘Wars of the Three British Kingdoms’ rather than the ‘English Civil War’), to assume,
in such a localized study as this one concerning interactions between individual settlers and
rebels, that what happened to William Seames or Robert Sharde in county Kerry could be related
to events in Oxford or London would be foolhardy. Furthermore, Munster had been
experiencing British plantation since the 1580s; the settler/native communities developed there
were unique even within Ireland: plantations were far younger and Catholics and Protestants
more divided elsewhere. While certain aspects of the rebellion and community interaction are
shared (indeed, these similarities are often the only evidence we have of a rebel force’s
connections with the wider rebellion), the conclusions drawn here are often specific to Munster
or even to the individual counties themselves; inferences to other areas should be made with
caution.
Due in large part to these differences in local conditions in Ireland, even within a small
area like western Munster, this study is organized regionally. The first chapter provides the
broader political and historical background for the events of the next three chapters. Included is
5

the general narrative of British hegemony in Ireland up to the rebellion, and its major events until
the 1643 one-year cessation of hostilities signed between the Marquis of Ormond and the
Confederation of Kilkenny. The discussion is necessarily focused mainly on the history and
events of Munster. Chapters two, three, and four relate the events of Kerry, Limerick, and Clare,
respectively. The actions of rebel forces and the popular violence (if any) in each county are
detailed and, perhaps more meaningfully, important aspects of seventeenth-century Irish society
such as Irish Catholic attitudes in 1641 and Munster’s religious awareness in general are inferred
from the language and actions of both the rebels and the Protestant deponents who gave the
accounts.
What emerges from this analysis is a rich, complex society which, while classified along
confessional lines, did not always adhere to these simplistic categorizations. Radical stereotypes
of Catholics painted by Protestants and the reverse had long outstripped the realities in both
England and Ireland. Stories of barbaric and bloodthirsty Catholics had circulated for decades in
England; they became the quintessential monster in any good Protestant’s closet. Catholics
were, by the 1640s, the proverbial “other” in Protestant British society. Irish and Old English
Catholics were considered complicit in the rebellion and guilty of the acts of their fellow
Catholics based on confessional affinity alone. Interestingly, religion was used far less as an
excuse for violence and robbery than ethnicity or nationality; even in cases in which the category
was deployed, it is clear that there was no demarcation made between the settlers’ religious
persuasion and his or her ethnic background. Protestant religion and English birth had collapsed
into one encompassing classification. The political disenfranchisement and the confiscation of
land that had been owned by Gaelic Irish landowners as little as fifty years ago was what the
Irish rebels—especially the Irish participating in popular violence—were rebelling against.
6

It was only after the Confederation defined itself in October 1642 as characteristically
Catholic that the rebellion attained its distinctly religious flavor. Although religious practices
and symbols were what various Catholic priests attempted to direct popular violence toward, this
type of confessional-based violence was rare amongst rebels acting of their own accord in the
first year. As can be seen in William Seames’ account given at the beginning of this chapter, it
was not his family’s Protestant prayer books that the McFynnens took, but their horses and
clothes; it was not Robert Sharde’s Anglican Bible that the rebels stole, but his book of accounts.
Rather than the religiously-driven wanton destruction of Protestantism that John Temple
described, what the Irish were actually attempting to achieve was a reversal of English interests
in Ireland, and a return to a traditionally Irish way of life. That Catholicism was a necessary part
of this proposed new Ireland was a result of the conjunction of religious and ethnic
classifications into two disparate groups, one English and Protestant, the other Irish and Catholic.
In contrast to the strictly political conflict in England, where neutrality was possible, the
pervasive nature of religion in seventeenth-century Britain (and Europe in general) meant that
any conflict between the two sides would necessarily be placed in a religious context. Indeed,
the Old English Catholics, who balked when rebellion first broke out, were forced to join the
rebellion in response to it being couched by Parliament and Protestants as a religious conflict,
when in fact the rebellion was an uprising by Irish Catholics against the political
disenfranchisement and property confiscations of the last century. The sectarian nature of the
initial conflict was due to common seventeenth-century classification methods, not to legitimate
grievances of a religious nature.
Finally, this study will also strike down some of the generalizations made about the
rebellion’s events in these remote areas. The date of the beginning of unrest will be pushed
7

farther back. Whereas spring and summer are often the vague dates given for the beginning of
unrest and hostilities in Munster, this study will conclusively show that by 1 January 1642 the
rebellion had reached these three counties and affected the residents sufficiently that authority
had essentially dissolved. Secondly, the commonly held notion that popular violence was
somehow absent in Munster will be challenged. While Kerry follows this rule, Clare and
Limerick experienced popular violence and robberies not directed by the “official” rebel forces
in those counties. Though these counties certainly did not see the same level of violence as
Ulster or Leinster, they experienced enough to be considered an important aspect of these
counties’ rebellion experience.
This study will portray—be it through local Irishmen and women sheltering their
Protestant neighbors from attack, Protestant settlers freely converting to Catholicism, or simply
the conduct of rebels upon capturing British strongholds or robbing British households—that the
settler societies which evolved in Munster were far more complex and amorphous than is
generally considered. However, to better understand the popular violence experienced in
Munster and Ireland in general, we must first examine the situations and relationships from
which the rebellion, begun on 22 October 1641 when Sir Phelim O’Neill took Charlemont and
Dungannon castles in Ulster, sprang forth.
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1 BACKGROUND AND EVENTS
At the beginning of the twelfth century Ireland was a largely homogenous, Gaelic
population that lived primarily as nomadic herdsmen.9 The Norman invasion of Ireland in the
1170s established the entire island as a possession of the English Crown by the end of the
century. This slowly gave way to a policy of feudal colonization through the granting of land
titles to Norman lords and barons.10 As the decades passed, these Norman lords governed their
fiefs in Ireland independently of the English kings, despite still technically owing allegiance to
the English monarchy. In reality, the English Crown had very little say in what happened in
Ireland outside of the area immediately around Dublin. Furthermore, the imposition of an
English ruling class gave Ireland a new, multiethnic edge which was unlike any other societal
dynamic in the British Isles.
The next and perhaps most important addition to the socio-religious dynamics in early
modern Irish history had its origins in England. The first important event, Henry VIII’s
insistence upon the whole of England breaking with Rome to satisfy his need for divorce, created
a religious divide between the English king and the Old English lords who ruled Ireland in his
name. Secondly, Henry’s 1541 assumption of the throne of Ireland, making Ireland a kingdom
rather than a lordship, indirectly announced his intention to rule Ireland more directly. Although
these events were not the genesis of many of the actions which shaped Ireland from the midsixteenth through the seventeenth century, they created both the religious dichotomy and the
political impetus which often influenced English policies and attitudes in Ireland for several
hundred years.
9

For a more in-depth view of Ireland and Irish society in the Middle Ages see: Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland:
The Enduring Tradition, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1988).
10
Karl S. Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 4.
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One such policy, created by Henry VIII as a result of his need to not only have a stronger
hand but a more legitimate rule in Ireland, is commonly referred to as surrender and regrant.
Surrender and regrant was the English monarchy’s attempt to reinforce the feudal relationships
between English king and Irish or Old English lords which had been ignored for centuries.11
Through this policy, Irish and Old English lords who often claimed to be the sole proprietors of
their Irish lands were allowed to keep their possessions unmolested if they first symbolically
surrendered that land to the English monarchy. In return, these nobles had their land granted
back to them at the king’s courtesy along with a new, English title. This subtle change was part
of the attempted anglicization of the Irish ruling class. As Brendan Kane has recently pointed
out, this move to appropriate the Irish and Old English ruling classes was due to the “significant
points of social and cultural contact between England and Gaelic and Gaelicized Ireland.”12
These cultural similarities (e.g., Gaelic family names are remarkably similar in both form and
function to English titles) were, according to Kane, the entire reason surrender and regrant was
viewed as viable in place of an economically debilitating conquest. Indeed, Kane states that
Anthony St. Leger, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in the 1540s and key English proponent of the
policy, “looked upon the Irish nobility as a co-optable one.”13
This policy worked with varying degrees of success in Ireland, with some Old English
and/or Irish families eager to end their ambiguous relationship with the English monarchy, while
others looked at it as an encroachment on their sovereignty. In Munster, for example, two
families that are integral to the story of the rebellion took advantage of this opportunity. The Old
English Boyle family surrendered their claims to sole possession of their south Munster lands
11

Bottigheimer, English Money, 6.
Brendan Kane, The Politics of Honour in Britain and Ireland, 1541-1641, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 21.
13
Kane, The Politics of Honour, 27, 3-27.
12
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and Richard Boyle became the Earl of Cork. The Gaelic Irish O’Brien family, ancestral rulers of
the isolated province of Thomond (modern Clare), also accepted fealty under the English
monarch and received the Earldom of Thomond. These families would also, though not
immediately, eventually convert to Protestantism in an attempt to curry even more favor with the
English court.
While surrender and regrant, as Kane has shown, was based upon reasonable premises, its
weakness came in its failure to recognize the recalcitrant nature of Old English and Gaelic Irish
nobles and their fiercely independent past. The failure of the policy led to numerous rebellions
(the Desmond rebellions of the 1570s and 80s in Munster being perhaps the best example of
reaction against the imposition of English rule) and demonstrated that Gaels could not be coerced
into surrendering their independence. It also showed that the Old English, despite identifying
with England as their ancestral homeland, maintained major differences of opinion with the
Crown’s policies, most notably in the monarchy’s intolerance of the Catholic faith.
After the Desmond rebellions and the realization of Surrender and Regrant’s inability to
bring Ireland to heel inexpensively, the English crown decided if it could not coopt or create a
docile and prosperous Ireland, it would simply import one. England now considered the best
way of avoiding further rebellion, which would have to be crushed militarily, was colonization.14
The “policy of plantation” borne from this realization became the most lasting and important
Tudor policy with respect to seventeenth-century events.15 The vast, confiscated lands of the
Earl of Desmond presented the English crown with the opportunity to settle parts of Ireland with
an industrious and obedient English population, and throughout the 1580s the monarchy began

14
15

Bottigheimer, English Money, 10-11.
Bottigheimer, English Money, 9.
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leasing the fertile Munster farmland to lords, commercial groups, and other adventurers under
the pretense that the land would be settled strictly with English settlers, and all Catholics—be
they Irish or Old English—would be forced off the land.
The machinations of the Munster plantation have been detailed by Michael MacCarthyMorrogh, but perhaps the most important lesson that can be gleaned from the experiment is that
it largely failed. The potential rewards and promised lands advertised across England were not
enough to entice settlers to the often tumultuous island that was full—as many English had been
taught for years—of barbaric Papists and Gaels eager to taste English blood.16 Furthermore, the
forcing of Irish tenants off their land by plantation created a vast pool of laborers and potential
tenants who did not have to be moved from England. The more unscrupulous adventurers were
willing to take advantage of this, often renting their land back to the same Irish families they had
forced off at rents three or four times higher. By 1592, nearly a decade after the initial plans of
plantation had been put forth, these developments forced the English crown to decrease its goal
of planted English tenants in Munster from 577,645 to 202,099.17 This number also proved far
too unreasonable, as historians’ best estimates suggest that perhaps a tenth of that number of
Protestants resided in Munster at the beginning of the rebellion in 1641. However, it is harder to
estimate how many settlers had reached Munster by the end of the sixteenth century, as the entire
settlement and its infrastructure was nearly completely destroyed by the rebellions which struck
the province in October 1598.18

16

Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh, The Munster Plantation: English Migration to Southern Ireland 1583-1641, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Most pamphlets which circulated in England about Irish and Catholics in
general were little more than hysterical propaganda. Joseph Cope, England and the 1641 Irish Rebellion, (Suffolk:
Boydell Press, 2009).
17
Bottigheimer, English Money, 12.
18
Toby Barnard, The Kingdom of Ireland, 1641-1760 (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2004), 3. Bottigheimer,
English Money, 13.
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While the haphazard enterprise failed for various reasons, some in Munster found ways to
profit.19 The Earl of Cork, who became one of most important actors in Irish politics in the first
half of the seventeenth century (up to his embarrassment at the hands of Lord Deputy
Wentworth), created most of what would become his Munster-based empire by shrewdly
acquiring the confiscated lands piecemeal.20 After gaining the lease on 20,000 acres in the
original Munster plantation, Cork spent the last decade of the sixteenth century securing
numerous unsuccessful plantations that were originally granted to adventurers and nobles who
had either managed the land poorly or did not have the resources to complete their own
objectives.21 This period culminated in his purchase of Sir Walter Raleigh’s 42,000 acres in
1602, the largest original grant of land over which Raleigh had been an exceptionally poor
steward.22 Through Cork’s shrewd buys and exploitation of Irish land, labor, and resources, he
developed a large economic base from which he launched his political career. Cork’s personal
finances were in such good order that when the rebellion began in 1641, he immediately spent
vast quantities of money to restock and rework the local defenses of the settlements and cities
under his purview.23
While the failure of the Munster plantation, in part due to planter incompetence and in
part due to open rebellion, allowed men like Cork to amass vast tracts of land at considerable
discounts, for the English Crown it provided lessons. The crown now realized the immense

19

While the reasons above are what most historians have pointed to as the causes for failure, including MacCarthyMorrogh (The Munster Plantation) and Nicholas Canny (Making Ireland British), most contemporary commentators
claimed—perhaps most vociferously Edmund Spenser—that failure was ultimately due to the English’s failure to
first clear out the Irish, whether by deportation or annihilation (Bottigheimer, English Money, 13).
20
Hugh F. Kearney, Strafford in Ireland 1633-41: a Study in Absolutism, (Manchester: The University Press, 1959).
Bottigheimer, English Money, 11-12.
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Nicholas Canny, Making Ireland British 1580-1650, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 313-327.
22
Bottigheimer, English Money, 12.
23
Jane Ohlmeyer, “The Civil Wars in Ireland,” in John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, ed., The Civil Wars: a Military
History of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638-1660, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75.
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amount of time, money, and manpower necessary if plantation—or any other English settlement
of Ireland—was to be successful.24 These hard-learned lessons would be applied in later
plantations, because although the plantation of the Desmond lands was one of the first attempted
English colonizations of Ireland, it was certainly not the last.25 The 1607 Flight of the Earls,
where several Ulster lords (including the patriarchs of the O’Neill and O’Donnell clans) fled to
the continent for fear of being arrested by English authorities, opened up vast stretches of
territory in Ulster which could be leased to adventurers. Thomas Wentworth attempted in the
1630s to confiscate and plant the lands of the Earl of Clanricard in Connacht despite the Earl
being an obedient subject of the Crown and having ironclad titles to his lands.
Plantation was increasingly seen by the English crown as a way of preventing further
rebellion by marginalizing and removing the economic base of past and potentially future
enemies. Settlement itself was not limited strictly to English Protestants; many leading Scottish
families took advantage of plantation lands offered by the crown and settled on the coast of
Ulster in lands that had been confiscated after the Tyrone Rebellion ended in 1603 or abandoned
in the Flight of the Earls. The Scots in general settled the Irish land better than their English
counterparts, largely due to the good relations and contact that had been kept up for centuries
between the MacDonnells of Ulster and the MacDonalds of western Scotland.26 Though the
Scots are relatively inconsequential to our story in western Munster, they become an important
piece in the story of the rebellion, as Robert Monro’s disciplined Covenanter army scored

24

Bottigheimer, English Money, 22.
Leix and Offaly (renamed King’s County and Queen’s County, respectively) were partially planted during the
mid-sixteenth century, though not to the extent that Desmond’s former lands in Munster were. G.A. Hayes-McCoy,
“Conciliation, Coercion, and the Protestant Reformation, 1547-71,” in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne,
ed., A New History of Ireland: Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 7779.
26
David Stevenson, Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates: Scottish-Irish Relations in the mid-Seventeenth
Century, (Antrim: W & G Baird Ltd., 1981), 8-11.
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significant victories against the Confederates while the English were concerned primarily with
their own civil war.
Politically, the first half of the seventeenth century created most of the
disenfranchisement of Catholics that helped spur the rebellion. With the accession of James I in
1603, both Catholics and Protestants in Ireland felt they had reason to rejoice. Protestants
assumed that James, a Protestant from birth, would consolidate what late sixteenth-century
plantation and conquest had begun. Catholics, meanwhile, assumed that the son of Mary Stuart
would be more sympathetic to the interests of a religion his mother had openly practiced. In
reality, James’ policies and attitude toward Ireland were similar to Elizabeth’s; Ireland was a
nuisance at its worst, a source of revenue at its best. The major changes of the first half of the
seventeenth century came from inside Ireland itself. Districts were packed and rearranged by Sir
Arthur Chichester and the Irish Privy Council to create the first Protestant majority in the Irish
House of Commons in the landmark 1613-15 parliamentary sessions.27 Catholics, both Old
English and Irish, despite still owning the majority of land in Ireland, would never again have
control of the Irish Parliament as it existed under the English Crown.
When Charles I succeeded to the throne in 1625, Catholics in Ireland again felt they had
reason to be optimistic, but results proved ambiguous. Though the Graces of 1628 which
“articulated [Catholic] concerns for the security of land tenure and requested that the crown not
only guarantee existing rights of ownership but end its policy of plantation” were requested by
the Old English in Ireland and initially promised by Charles, their implementation was never

27

Aidan Clarke with R. Dudley Edwards, “Pacification, Plantation, and the Catholic Question, 1603-23,” in T.W.
Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne, ed., A New History of Ireland: Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 214-217.
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realized.28 Blocked both by the Irish Privy Council and the Irish Parliament itself, Charles’
conviction on the issue diminished significantly once peace was made with Spain and his need
for Irish money dissipated. Regardless of the concessions Charles made at times when it was
politically and financially advantageous, Catholics in Ireland and Britain were still, as a general
rule, discriminated against; Charles himself described them as “half-subjects.”29
Catholics again were thrown into a state of uncertainty when in 1632 Viscount Thomas
Wentworth, elevated as the first Earl of Strafford in January 1640, became Lord Deputy of
Ireland and ruled, in his own words, “thoroughly.” Though he personally abhorred Catholicism,
Wentworth was a servant of Charles first. He refused to favor Protestant policies and goals
explicitly unless it supported the aims of the English crown.30 Instead, he favored a sophisticated
and initially successful approach of playing factions—Old English and New English, both and
the Irish, Catholic and Protestant—off one another in order to gain the largest advantage both for
the English crown and for his own person as Charles’ deputy in Ireland. While Wentworth’s
strategies turned Ireland, for the first time ever, into a revenue source rather than an economic
drain for the English Crown, he did it at the expense of public favor.31
In March 1640 Wentworth, still very much in control of parliamentary events in Ireland,
attempted to secure from the Irish Parliament grants to pay for a 9,000-man army and an
additional six subsidies to be paid to the King over a three-year span. The House of Commons,
28
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after some debate (Old English members vehemently opposed any subsidies without the
implementation of the Graces), granted four subsidies while also drafting a letter professing
endless loyalty on behalf of all of Ireland for Charles I. Indeed, when Strafford left later in 1640
for England, the only news from Ireland was peaceful: the Protestant clergy who sat in the upper
house had approved Strafford’s original six subsidies plan, and the arrangements he had made to
raise new troops were going smoothly.32
This apparent placidity, however, was short-lived. Wentworth, before his departure, had
initiated the collection of the first subsidy without the Commons’ approval, causing uproar. Sir
Christopher Wandesford, Wentworth’s deputy whom he left in charge, was forced to prorogue
Parliament until 10 October 1640 to avoid the ratification of a petition demanding the
government’s attention to forty-four grievances against Wentworth and his policies. When
Parliament did reconvene, tempers were no cooler and no official business was transacted, as the
Commons demanded a reduction in the amount of each subsidy and the reinstatement of
boroughs which Wentworth had gerrymandered away to ensure a parliamentary majority in the
government’s favor. Wentworth’s skillful manipulation of Ireland’s fractious ethno-religious
groups was breaking down. New English and Old English, at odds in the Irish Parliament since
the Protestant settlers had first arrived, were briefly united, and only in their universal opposition
to Strafford’s policies.33 Strafford had few friends in England, and the personal empire he had
built in the Crown’s name in Ireland was used against him. The 9,000-man army he had
commissioned in Ireland became a symbol of what Charles’ opponents saw as the Crown’s
increasingly Catholic leanings and its designs against the English Parliament. Strafford was put
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on trial for treason, and was later executed in May 1641 via a bill of attainder. Charles, eager to
have Irish money and troops, sacrificed Strafford and made further concessions to the Irish
Parliament, including several which would guarantee Catholic land titles.34 The only grievance
that Charles outright refused to consider was the Irish Parliament’s assertion of its right to
determine the laws of Ireland with Charles’ assent, independent of the English Parliament.35
Ironically, despite the ascendancy of the Protestant New English population in both
political power and land ownership, only about 10% of the population was of English Protestant
stock. In Munster in particular, there were only approximately 22,000 first or second generation
New English settlers in Munster. These settlers tended to cluster around the major cities of Cork,
Youghal, Tallow, Bandon, Kinsale, and to a lesser extent, Limerick, whose urban and outlying
rural land was still dominated by primarily Catholic, Old English citizens.36 Despite the
confiscations, Catholics still owned approximately 59% of Irish land at 1641. Considering that
by 1688 Catholics had only retained 22% and that that number was further reduced to 14% by
1691, it is clear that the attempted coup by Irish and Old English Catholics in the 1640s
represents a pivotal moment in Irish political and religious history.37
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The lack of any real political power for the majority of the population was the proverbial
powder keg which required a match. This was provided by a group of heavily indebted Gaelic
Catholic nobles and lords in Ulster. The story of the conspirators of the Ulster rebellion has been
told numerous times, and consists of two parts.38 After a spring and summer of covert planning,
Phelim O’Neill and a group of co-conspirators decided to rise in Ulster, taking as many Englishcontrolled fortresses and towns as possible. Simultaneously, a group led by Conor Maguire
would take Dublin Castle and the stores of arms and powder within, holding out until
reinforcements could arrive from Ulster. Though one bold historian has claimed this second part
of the plot was fabricated after the fact, it is generally accepted this was the plan.39
Unfortunately, due to an inebriated co-conspirator who got cold feet the night before the
intended storming of the Castle, the local magistrates were notified of the plot and the
conspirators in Dublin were foiled.
The failure in Dublin is perhaps the most important reason why the plot escalated into a
full-blown rebellion and island-wide breakdown in authority; the original plan of the conspirators
was not to create the quasi-independent Irish state that the rebellion later became. As several
historians have noted, the O’Neill and Maguire conspirators were originally attempting to use the
Anglo-Scottish crisis: an uncharacteristic weakness in the English political and military machine
which the Covenanters had astutely exploited, and which these disenfranchised Irish noblemen
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saw as a chance to bolster their negotiating position.40 In essence, the taking of Dublin Castle
and the Ulster strongholds was supposed to be the Irish Catholics’ Newcastle.
Despite the failure in Dublin, O’Neill’s Ulster rebels were experiencing far greater
success. On 22 October 1641, soon after dark, Phelim O’Neill and a small band of Irish
Catholics took Dungannon and Charlemont castles to the southwest of Lough Neagh through
various forms of deception. At Charlemont, for instance, O’Neill pretended to be a dinner guest
and upon entering overtook the guards and proceeded with his band of men to take over the
castle.41 Within three days the rebels had captured enough castles and towns to mount a serious
threat to British authority in Ulster.42 For the first three weeks of the rebellion O’Neill’s forces
remained smaller bands taking English castles and settlements until 10 November, when he
assembled his first sizeable force, possibly as large as 3,000 men and horses, at Lisburn.43 On 24
November 1641, the rebels scored their first major military victory against English governmental
forces at Julianstown.44
For the understanding of events in Munster it is important to note that the rebellion
spread to Tipperary and Waterford by December 1641, and, most historians claim, reached
Clare, Cork, and Limerick by spring 1642, though when it did it broke in isolated instances.45
There are, however, depositions which maintain that acts of violence and rebellion were seen in
Clare and Limerick as early as Christmas 1641, and it would seem from the evidence that these
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reported attacks are symptomatic of an earlier start to the rebellion in these areas rather than
isolated incidents.46
As haphazard forces sprang up across Munster, disarray and confusion became the order
of the day. In the last few months of 1641, before the rebellion had even reached Munster
proper, simply the fear of the rebellion was disrupting trade in the province. Later in 1642, war
and unrest in England further dislocated the Irish economy, as it not only eliminated the
possibility of tangible aid but also halted demand for Irish goods in Ireland’s main export market.
This maelstrom of economic bad fortune helped to spur, according to Gillespie, the one year
cessation of hostilities signed between English forces and the rebels in 1643.47
Adding to the confusion, in July 1642, 1000 men sent by the English Parliament under
the Scottish commander Lord Forbes landed west of Cork in Munster and plunged into the
countryside, pillaging and plundering Catholic settlements without apprising Lord Inchiquin, the
Crown’s commander of forces in Munster. This loud and bumbling enterprise was not hard to
catch up with, and Forbes was ambushed at Clonakilty by rebel forces, after which he retreated
to Kinsale and sailed first west and then north where he ravaged coastal settlements in Clare and
Galway before returning to England. 48
As the Crown amassed what troops it could, in eastern Munster the rebels massed their
largest force under Richard Butler, Viscount Mountgarrett, who joined the rebellion on 30
November 1640. The uncle of the Protestant Marquis of Ormond, James Butler, Mountgarrett’s
forces had effective control of all of county Tipperary within two days. From there they
continued into the heart of Munster, into north county Cork, where they overran several
46
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settlements, the largest being Mallow. This force, however, disbanded soon after this victory due
to bickering between Mountgarrett’s commanders over objectives.49 Military units in Munster
on both sides of the conflict seem often to have disassembled as quickly as they mustered. This
is in part due to the amorphous nature of both the rebellion proper and popular rebellion, but was
also caused by the severe lack of funds officials of the English government in Ireland received as
the lines of communication and allegiance in England got considerably more tangled. Lord
Inchiquin continually complained to the Marquis of Ormond of a lack of resources necessary to
maintain a substantial force. This forced Inchiquin into a conciliatory position with the rebels,
causing him to remain in castles or fortress towns.50 He repeatedly reported to Ormond of unrest
among his troops concerning back pay and poor supplies throughout the early stages of the
rebellion, and in January 1643 he wrote that he feared his troops would disband themselves,
irrespective of his orders or those from the Crown.51 By June 1643 there were only 6,000 troops
paid by Parliament in Munster, and only part of this force was under Inchiquin’s command. This
number pales in comparison with Ulster and Leinster, where the English government had 20,000
and 15,000 troops respectively.52 In July 1644, Inchiquin would defect from the crown to
Parliament and renew his fight with the rebels, but even then he received only meager funds.53
The Irish rebels were more organized than their opponents, and soon after the Irish
Confederacy was instituted at Kilkenny in October 1642, Garrett Barry was given control of the
6,000-strong rebel army in Munster. Inchiquin, despite having a force of roughly half that
number, defeated Barry’s forces outside of Liscarroll in the Blackwater Valley. However,
49
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strapped for supplies and resources, he could not press his advantage. The weakness of
Protestant forces in Ireland—and Munster especially—presented the Catholic rebels with easy
opportunities to score victories and gain important strongholds while armies like Inchiquin’s
were stalled, waiting for supplies and direction.54 By December 1642, the rebels controlled
nearly every castle and city in Munster outside of Cork.55 Coupled with the landing of more
siege guns from the continent in April 1643, adding to the few they had gleaned from towns and
English fortifications, the Irish conquest of Munster rapidly sped up and further disadvantaged
Inchiquin.56 Eventually, Inchiquin reluctantly signed the one-year truce Ormond negotiated with
the rebel forces in September 1643, but only because he had little choice at the time. The
September 1643 truce brought an end to most of the fighting in Munster.57
These are the important actors and events in Munster leading up to and during the first
stage (from breakout to 1643 cessation) of the Irish rebellion. What has not yet been explored is
how anger at the political disenfranchisement and property confiscation manifested itself at the
community level. Indeed most historians, it seems, would rather “explain why 1641 occurred
rather than to consider what happened.”58 The popular revolt that took place concurrently in the
majority of the country has received far less attention. While we owe a great deal of gratitude to
the likes of Aidan Clarke and M. Perceval-Maxwell for their treatment of parliament and the
nobility, the revolt is all too often viewed by those focusing on political affairs as a specifically
Ulster event; the rebellion, as Canny has stated, must be viewed both as a political coup d’état
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and a popular insurrection.59 Different parts of society—whether Catholic priests, Protestant
landowners, or Gaelic chieftains—exploited their local situation to achieve their own
objectives.60 As the following chapters will demonstrate, it is important for us to examine the
reactions—both of the political elite and population in general—in each region.
For example, the Catholic clergy throughout Ireland attempted to focus the energies of
the rebellion into religious purposes: be it the destruction of Protestant Bibles, prayer books, or
places of worship.61 Many Catholic priests who had come to Ireland or Irish priests who had
returned by 1641 had been trained on the continent, bringing the fervent teachings of counterReformation Catholicism with them.62 As David Stevenson has noted, Franciscan missionaries
from the continent were active as early as 1619 and reporting positive results in all of Ireland and
even western Scotland.63 Many Catholic clergy saw the rebellion as their greatest opportunity to
practice full, counter-Reformation theology for the first time in Ireland. Perhaps as a result of
this feeling, the clergy may have fostered the popular rebellion in places. However, these
militant clergymen were often unable to keep the rebellion purely religious in its objectives, with
violence often being perpetrated against English and Protestants themselves, rather than simply
their religious objects and practices.64 Surprisingly, some Catholic priests adopted a charitable
attitude toward their previous oppressors; many were responsible for aiding and abetting escapes
of Protestant residents who became the targets of such attacks.65 This supports the idea that
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although the Catholic clergy supported the rebellion, most, if not all, did not support the
individual acts of violence against Englishmen or Protestants.66
This example alone is proof of the diverse and nuanced aims of different groups who
took part in the popular rebellion. The relative neglect the popular rebellion has received in
historical study is in response to the credibility of sources for which nearly all of the observations
of the period at the community level must be derived: the 1641 depositions. Most of the
depositions cannot be assumed to be entirely truthful. Indeed, the depositions “[are] often
inaccurate, biased, and misleading.”67 For example, the claims made by deponent Robert
Maxwell of county Armagh that 154,000 Protestants were killed in Ulster are definitively false.68
Our best estimates today are that by 1641, only 15,000 British Protestants were even settled in
Ulster, rendering Maxwell’s figure impossible.69 Even more prevalent in the depositions than
outright fiction is hearsay. The standards of taking eyewitness testimony were not the same as
they are today. During the first round of depositions taken in 1642 and 1643, the witnesses were
encouraged by the recorders to repeat not just everything that had happened to them, but any act
of the rebellion or Protestant human suffering they had heard of.70 For instance, several
deponents report that at Newry an unborn baby was ripped from the womb of its Protestant
mother and tossed into a ditch.71 Despite this story appearing numerous times in depositions
from various counties, not a single deponent witnessed the act or could name its perpetrator or
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victim. It is unlikely then that this grisly event actually took place; it was simply one of the
numerous rumors about the rebellion and Catholic bloodlust which proliferated at this time.
The depositions transcribed by Henry Jones and his officials in Dublin are rife with these
inaccurate, second-hand stories; the account related by Ellen Matchett in county Armagh
provides an excellent example of what pertinent information can be taken from the depositions
and what cannot be used. Of use is Matchett’s account of how she and her husband had been
expelled from their house by a small band of rebels and robbed of most of their household goods,
horses, and livestock. Although some were strangers, she named the attackers she recognized:
the O’Hanlons and O’Hagans of county Armagh. She continued, relating her and her daughter’s
harrowing escape to Michael Dunn’s house in Hockley, whose wife “being an English
gentlewoman” offered them shelter where they hid for some time, forced to survive on whatever
they could forage: “they could get a few nettles & course weeds to eat & sometimes when they
got but the brains of a Cow dead of diseases: boiled with Nettles they accounted that good
fare.”72 While Matchett’s experience is most likely true, the rest of her deposition relating events
she did not witness in person are suspect, and at times definitively false. For example, her
account of the massacre of Protestants in a house in Shewis is almost entirely inaccurate. The
details of the deposition of Ann Smith and Margret Clark, who were lucky enough to be only
“knocked in the head”73 by the Irish rebels as they fled the burning house, contradicts the story
told by Matchett. Where Matchett claims that 110 English Protestants had crept into an outhouse
for safety, Smith and Clark tell how they were driven into a thatched-roof home by the rebels,
and estimated only that forty English Protestants filled the house. Matchett further states that the
rebels continued to force fleeing Protestants back into the fire until “they were all burned to
72
73

Deposition of Ellen Matchett, (TCD, MS 836, 058r), 484.
Deposition of Ann Smith & Margret Clark (TCD, MS 836, 073r), 569.

26

death & consumed.”74 Smith and Clark’s very survival long enough to give a deposition
contradicts Matchett’s story. Even more so than just relating incorrect details, the end of
Matchett’s deposition is full of rumor and fabrication. Manus O’Cahan, an Irishman from
Loughgall, supposedly “begged for his breakfast the heads of all the protestants of Sir Phelim
Roe O’Neill” and that later “his request was granted.”75 While this is certainly one of the more
outlandish claims made by anyone in the depositions, it exemplifies the biases present in portions
of the accounts. Embellishment beyond one’s own personal experience was encouraged, and it
manifested itself often in the secondary and tertiary accounts of Irish Catholic atrocities.
Even though the depositions of the survivors forms “a body of material which is
emotional and which seeks to represent Irish Catholics in the worst possible light, … this
Protestant testimony cannot be ignored,” if only because they provide our only insights into the
direct effects of the insurrection on the population.76 If John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer are
correct it was not only political issues, but also widespread “rural unrest and urban misery
[which] created conditions that were ripe for revolt.”77 In order to understand the rebellion in its
entirety, we must look not only at the political wrangling and major events described above, but
also grasp what occurred in Ireland’s communities to comprehend the motivations for Irish
Catholics to join the rebellion proper or engage in popular violence.
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2 COUNTY KERRY
County Kerry, like its counterpart across the Shannon county Clare, is an isolated
province. Composed largely of two peninsulas which jut out into the Atlantic, most of the
county is made up of hilly, rocky terrain, suitable mainly for animal husbandry rather than
agriculture. This fact most likely kept Kerry sparsely settled—by either English or Irish—in
1641. Even today, Kerry only boasts a population of 140,000, and its largest town, Tralee, a
mere 20,000. Given the paucity of records which survive for Kerry, it is impossible to estimate
the seventeenth-century population of Kerry, though not its composition. The vast majority of
Kerry was native Irish. What few British settlers there were tended to reside in urban centers,
like Tralee.78
Most historians have largely approximated the beginning of the rebellion in county
Kerry. While some have claimed rebellion first spread to Kerry in the spring of 1642 or even
late in the summer, most Protestant deponents report their first encounter with rebels being far
earlier in 1642. Thomas Turner, Moses Dowdall, and William Love all reported having their
goods taken from them around Candlemas, in the first few days of February.79 William Seames,
whose personal story was related in the introduction, first encountered violence in mid-January.80
In addition, William Hayles, had his cows and horses taken by Captain Sugan and a company of
approximately 100 men on 14 January.81 Still earlier, William Lascells, John Newman, Henry
Coply, and several others report first encountering rebels in the first week of 1642.82 Richard
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Taylor claims his goods were taken from him “around Christmas,” 1641.83 Many of these
reports are not simply isolated attacks; the siege of Tralee Castle, Stephen Love described, began
on 14 February 1642.84
Furthermore, the robberies and violence that these settlers encountered in early 1642 was
both from larger bands and from opportunistic individuals. Both the McFynnens and Capt.
Sugan already had large forces in the county in January. When Seames was taken prisoner by
Charles MacCarthy and Capt. Sugan, he estimated their force to be 300 strong.85 That number is
corroborated by several witnesses, including Michael Vine who witnessed the forces in midFebruary after he took refuge in Tralee Castle.86 The independence of the force is blurred;
despite multiple deponents mentioning the armies of the McFynnens and Capt. Sugan
independently, they were more than likely one and the same. Which family—McFynnens or
MacCarthys—initially raised the force is unclear from depositional evidence alone, but by
February Sugan was clearly the leader, and there was most likely one principal band of rebels in
the county.
While Sugan’s force appears to be the only thing resembling an operational army in
county Kerry, it is hard to be certain if he was in contact with members of O’Neill’s Ulster
rising; Sugan was killed in August 1643 and left no writings. The only evidence of any contact
between Sugan and the rebellion proper in Ulster and elsewhere is circumstantial. For example,
many members of Sugan’s forces, when asked to justify their actions by Protestant deponents,
gave a response similar to that of their northern counterparts: they were rebelling in the king’s
name and against the English hegemony in Ireland and the Protestantism that came with it.
83
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Charles, in most rebels’ eyes, was not only complicit in the rebellion but openly supportive. The
second, and perhaps most convincing piece of evidence, is Sugan’s coordinated sieges of two
castles in county Kerry. Fortified positions most likely would not have been attacked unless
Sugan had an interest in clearing out English-controlled strongholds; this was something the
peasant rebellion in Leinster lacked and was prevalent among the rebellion proper only after the
confederacy was established in October 1642 and a formal attempt at a legitimate, separate
government of Ireland was made. As Rolf Loeber and Geoffrey Parker have pointed out, Irish
troops had traditionally excelled in skirmishes and ambushes while the English often attempted
to control the countryside from urban fortresses or stand-alone castles; for either of the sides
venturing far into each other’s domain was a foolhardy risk. 87 This is in part why we see so
many Protestants in all of Ireland fleeing to castles or cities after either being attacked or upon
hearing of unrest nearby.
While the majority of the reports come from deponents claiming harassment by Sugan or
forces under his command, there are multiple depositions which report isolated attacks by minor,
most likely independent rebels. Many of these attacks seem personal in nature; the English
deponent often knew his attacker well enough to be able to give their name, occupation, and
sometimes even residence in the deposition. Gilbert Harvey, for example, was stripped of his
clothes by Art O’Leary, a neighbor he apparently knew well.88 Despite these incidents, it should
be noted there was no widespread peasant uprising as took place in Ulster and in western
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Leinster.89 Most of the robberies and violence which took place in county Kerry can be traced
back to agents or forces commanded by Capt. Sugan or the McFynnens. For example, though
men like Owen O’Sullivan or Walter Hussey are named several times as the only perpetrator,
they are mentioned enough times in the company of Sugan, or other MacCarthys, McFynnens,
and McDermods that it can reasonably be assumed that even if they were acting independently,
they were doing so in an effort to gather supplies and arms for Sugan’s larger force.
If Sugan had the only large force in the county and there are no reports of Protestant
troops ever entering Kerry, the question remains, what were these forces gathering supplies for?
The answer is perhaps our best proof of a link between Sugan’s forces in the county and the
rebellion proper: the systematic siege of Protestant castles and strongholds within the county.
The Irish typically did not conduct sieges in the early-modern sense; their arms and tactics were
better suited to open-field skirmishes. Indeed, as Loeber and Parker have shown, Ireland came
into contact with the continental military revolution through its returning officers, as many had
been formally trained in Flanders and/or Spain in the latest military tactics and weaponry. Men
like Owen Roe O’Neill and Thomas Preston returned to their ancestral homeland and would
come to form the base from which the Confederate military would be created.90 Before their
arrival, siege warfare would be haphazard at best, and enticing only if the force’s motive was to
root out all English and Protestant authority. Sieges occurred—in county Kerry and the island in
general—at castles, towns, or even churches when the group of Protestants taking shelter inside
were perceived as a potential threat to the future of the rebellion.91 Castles, after all, were often
of extreme importance to the English settlers both as safe garrisons and outposts which could
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provide advanced warning for nearby residents.92 Furthermore, at the beginning of the rebellion,
before the continental officers had returned to Ireland with both men and supplies, the rebel
forces in general lacked any sort of artillery; the cannons and siege equipment located in Munster
were brought over by English adventurers and settlers to protect their land and towns in the late
sixteenth century. The artillery they did have was procured in the taking of English fortresses
and castles. For example, when Limerick Castle fell to the rebels in June 1642, the rebels
captured three large cannon, one that commentators reported weighed over 800 standard pounds
and fired thirty-two pound shot. So rare was artillery in seventeenth-century Ireland that there
are several reports during the rebellion of castles surrendering to rebels who had siege
equipment, the warders merely terrified by the sight of such destructive pieces.93 Regardless, the
steps and munitions necessary for the siege of a castle full of Protestants means it was highly
unlikely that a few bands of opportunistic rebels would have endeavored something as lengthy
and costly as a castle siege if their only objective was loot and wanton violence against
vulnerable Protestants.
Documentation of two such sieges remains from the depositions of county Kerry. The
first and best documented was the siege at Tralee Castle. Tralee Castle, according to Stephen
Love, was under siege from 14 February 1642 until sometime in August.94 Other deponents
place the beginning slightly earlier in February.95 It appears the entire force Sugan had
organized as of February was present at the siege. While certain deponents estimate his forces at
600, 700, or even 3,000-strong (this estimate also says Sugan commanded a cavalry of 100
horses, which is almost surely untrue; while horses were certainly present, it is doubtful any
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rebel forces this early in the rebellion included any company of trained cavalry), the force was
most likely around 300 men, especially at the beginning of the siege.96 Soon after the siege
began, Tralee itself was plundered by the rebels, most likely in search of supplies and arms. One
deponent claims the siege was conducted by “freeholders and gentlemen.”97 This speaks not
only to the impromptu nature of the force at Tralee, but the likely composition of Sugan’s forces
in general. Sugan’s force in Kerry—at least at this stage in the rebellion—was certainly
haphazardly assembled, led and organized by his kinsmen and local gentry. More evidence of
this comes from Stephen Love, who tells us that Edmund Hussey rode into Love’s hometown of
Killarney as early as 15 November 1641 and exhorted the residents to convert to Catholicism and
gather arms in order to join him in open rebellion.98
While we know accurately when the siege began and ended, what occurred during the
siege of Tralee itself is somewhat unclear. Most of the accounts we have of what went on inside
the castle are second-hand extrapolations by deponents and therefore suspect at best. Due to the
absence of any reports of violence or other settler-rebel encounters during the rebel plundering of
the town of Tralee, most residents had likely either taken refuge in one of two local castles
(Ballycarty Castle being the other) or fled the city. With the approach of the rebel army, most
denizens would have stopped all activities and fled to the castle out of terror of Catholics or rebel
forces in general. With news of the rising in Ulster spreading quickly, several dozen had most
likely taken refuge before Sugan or other Kerry Catholics had risen up themselves. Estimates of
the number of English Protestant settlers who had taken refuge in Tralee Castle vary wildly, but
a rough approximation of 300-500 refugees most likely resided in the castle when the siege
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began. With that number warded up in a small castle, supplies surely ran out quickly. The
best—and probably most accurate—account of the conditions inside Tralee Castle comes to us
from Michael Vine. Driven from his house in the town of Tralee by the approaching rebels, he
describes the conditions thus:
he [the deponent] saith that they were forced to eat raw salt hides that did stink
and drink some water that was as black as ink and as thick as if it were thicked
with flower and other water as if it were thicked with yellow clay and he saith that
died for want and killed by the enemy there at least two hundred of the men,
women and children during the siege of said castle.99

This is a typical account of what occurred inside most castles under siege during the early
rebellion. The Protestant settlers, startled and exposed by the unexpected uprising, likely had
little time to gather their belongings, let alone prepare supplies for a protracted siege in an
overcrowded castle. Vine’s account of hunger and want inside the besieged castle is further
corroborated by fellow warder Teige MacMahowny, who claims that by August the refugees
were forced to begin eating the neighborhood cats and dogs.100 The number of Protestants who
died of dearth within the castle is accurate as well; all other first-hand accounts of the siege
estimate the number of dead within the castle in the 150-200 range. So dire did the situation
become near the end of the siege that soon upon being released and driven away from Tralee
Castle by the rebels, Elizabeth Harris’ husband drank water from the first puddle he saw,
contracted an illness (probably dysentery) and died within days.101
The siege itself seems to have been more of a smoke and mirrors effort than anything
else. Given the lack of artillery controlled by rebel forces, especially in such a remote county
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as Kerry, this is not surprising. Furthermore, what artillery and cannon shot the rebels did
possess was likely not enough—both in size and in number—to bring down the walls or
battlements of a castle. Furthermore, as the rebels were without the direction of the
continental-trained Catholic rebels who would arrive later in the year, their attempts at even
using the artillery they did have competently was most likely primitive at best. For example,
at Tralee the rebels brought newly acquired cannon to the castle near the end of April and shot
thirteen or fourteen times against the walls.102 Having little effect (and possibly having run
out of ammunition and gunpowder), the rebels’ heavy fire lasted only one day, and soon after
they may have begun mining operations against the castle walls, though reports of this
activity—and the subsequent Protestant countermining which purportedly killed “many
rebels”—are uncorroborated and suspect at best.103 With few resources with which to strongarm their way into the castle and little threat from a relieving English Protestant force, the
rebel army seemed content to wait out the Protestants within.
The time at which the castle was given up to the rebels—August 1642—seems to be
the only thing about the surrender the deponents agree on. Some claim that the castle could
have held out far longer and did not need to be given up when it did.104 By most accounts
however, Tralee Castle was surrendered upon terms agreed upon by the Protestants within and
the rebel leaders. The warders, driven by the extreme conditions inside the castle walls,
probably concluded terms more out of necessity than any desire to settle with their attackers.
The rebels, if they indeed were acting in concert with the rebellion proper, were probably
more than willing to settle with the besieged as their objective was to eliminate an English
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stronghold in the countryside, not the wholesale murder of British Protestants. The agreement
purportedly guaranteed the safety of the Protestant warders and what few of their goods
remained. The quarter given, however, was far less generous. Most deponents report that
upon Tralee Castle being surrendered, most English deponents who had survived the siege
were robbed of their belongings and stripped of their clothing. With the exception of a few
reported isolated incidents of warders being hanged upon leaving the castle by Sugan’s men,
the warders were generally unharmed; that is, if one can consider being left naked and
penniless in the Irish winter unmolested.
The experience at the other Protestant stronghold in Kerry is depicted in only one
deposition, but it is a unique one: the deposition, titled “Deposition of John Abraham &
others,” is one of the few that credits multiple authors. John Abraham gave the principal
account, which was then corroborated, revised, and added to by several other warders of
Ballycarty Castle. Ballycarty Castle was located just two miles outside of Tralee, and it is
where most of the farmers of the surrounding area took refuge when Sugan’s army appeared
in the area. According to the account, nearly 300 men, women and children sought refuge in
the castle. The piecemeal nature of warders assembling in castles and local strongholds is
displayed best in this deposition: Nicholas Roberts said he first sent his two daughters and
wife to take refuge in Ballycarty Castle in the middle of December 1641 when he first heard
news of unrest. He joined them two weeks later.105
Ballycarty Castle’s experience was characteristically different in that the Protestant
warders did not put up a fight. According to Abraham, the castle was surrendered to forces
loyal to Capt. Sugan on 20 November 1642, who had most likely made their natural
105

John Abraham and others, (TCD, MS 828, 211r).

36

progression to the next Protestant stronghold after eliminating the English threat at Tralee
Castle. Though the details are murky, it would appear that with the agreement of the
deponents the castle was given up by the local constable Robert Blenerhasset and the castle’s
owner, Sir Edward Denny. Under the agreement made between these leaders and the rebel
forces, the castle was surrendered with the condition that the English Protestants who had
taken refuge there and their belongings would be given quarter and safe passage to an English
garrison in Cork, where all those who would not submit to an Irish Catholic government
would be sent back to England. The deponents, though told this before the surrender by
Robert Blenerhasset, claim that no such deal ever actually existed, and as at Tralee three
months prior the warders were stripped and robbed and forced to depart the castle unprotected
from either rogue rebels or the weather.106
These are the two principal accounts we have of castle sieges which took place in
Kerry. The prolonged siege Tralee Castle experienced and the similar treatment at the hands
of the conquerors of both castles mean that not only was Sugan’s force largely unopposed in
the county (probably due to Inchiquin’s lack of resources and his preoccupation with larger
forces in more populated parts of Munster in Cork, Limerick, and Waterford) but that it was
also almost certainly working in concert with the wider, island-wide rebellion; this was no
band of marauding Catholics seeking wanton violence and destruction of Protestant property
and persons. Indeed, in respect to other counties in Ireland, Kerry is relatively bereft of
accounts of rebels acting alone. The accounts of the two castles above are the most recurrent
events related in the Kerry depositions, and those that relate to other sieges are generally from
residents of county Kerry who migrated during the unrest and confusion, encountering
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violence in Limerick or Cork.107 What accounts of rogue rebels that exist are far too brief and
extraordinary to make any widespread conclusions about popular violence in the county; it
cannot be considered a substantial phenomenon at all.
Perhaps predictably, the violence experienced by the settlers in county Kerry, whether
occurring around castles or on the deponent’s own property, which best reveal seventeenthcentury Irish society are most suggestive of the underlying motives of the Catholic rebels.
One of the most prevalent acts in the encounters between English Protestant settlers in county
Kerry and hostile rebels is the stripping of Protestants. Almost all of the deponents who
provide credible accounts of the violence describe some type of forcible removal of clothing.
John Abraham and his fellow deponents claim that all three hundred men, women and
children who had taken refuge inside Ballycarty Castle had the clothes literally taken off their
backs when the castle was peacefully surrendered to Sugan’s men.108 Perhaps the most
interesting part of William Seames’ story, whose personal account was told at the beginning
of this study, is that when the “seven score” Protestant settlers who had resided near
Glanaroughty were rounded up, they appear to only have been stripped of their clothing and
nothing else. Cathy Cox, a resident of county Kerry who had fled to Cork soon after her
family was robbed in January, heart-wrenchingly described watching her two children die of
exposure after their clothes were taken by a small band of rebels.109 Phineas Lascells was
stripped by the Donnell McFynnen’s servants, and Margaret Percy was stripped by Catholic
strangers.110 John Johnson, likely one of the approximately 140 Protestants described by
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Seames, even reported hearing Donogh McFynnen instruct all of the Irish around
Glanaroughty to rob and strip all Protestants they came in contact with.111
The ritualized stripping appears to have served only a symbolic purpose; at this point
in the rebellion there was no regular army which needed to be clothed and/or uniformed. It
should also be noted that there are only a tiny amount of credible accounts—absolutely zero
in the three counties in this study—of this indiscriminate stripping of victims ever becoming
sexual. As stripping and robbing was often accompanied by minimal violent interaction, the
raping of Protestant victims may have worked against the Catholic rebels in a number of
ways. First, with some robberies being physically non-violent, the rape of the victims would
have crossed a threshold of sorts, adding an unrestrained level of debasement to an otherwise
orderly process. Second, rape and defilement of the settlers would have only served to enrage
local Protestant populations and provide a rallying cry and a tangible reason to organize and
counter the rebellion. After all, as the accounts at Tralee and Ballycarty Castle convey, the
English Protestant settlers had little impetus to openly oppose the rebel forces as long as they
could guarantee the safety of their families and livelihoods. Though the second of these
priorities was often lost (though, it should be noted, most pre-surrender arrangements, like
that of Tralee and Ballycarty Castles, attempted to protect Protestant goods, whether or not
they were adhered to by the conquering rebels) the raw debasement of Protestant bodies—a
fate often seen as worse than death in early-modern Christendom—would certainly have
raised the ire of settlers who without it were disposed to accept their fates as Protestants at the
mercy of rebelling Irish Catholics. Furthermore, stripped and being left both literally and
symbolically exposed, Canny has suggested, may have been considered more degrading than
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rape.112 In addition, most credible accounts that depict the Catholic clergy maintain that most
clergymen attempted to direct the violence toward Protestant symbols, not Protestants
themselves. If the clergy was as influential in rebel policy in the early stages of the rebellion
as they were once the Confederation of Kilkenny was solidified, this may have also dampened
the level of physical violence perpetrated by Catholic rebels. While it may be reading too
much into the situation to contend that individual rebels and their leaders were acting with
these nuanced assumptions in mind, the absence of rape in accompaniment with the stripping
of settlers means there was little urge among the rebels to exact physical harm upon the
Protestant settlers whose clothes they were taking.
On a deeper level, the stripping of Protestant settlers inverted the shifting political
and social situation in Ireland. Since Henry VIII’s decision to take a stronger role in Ireland’s
governance, power and influence in Irish policy increasingly became concentrated in Dublin
and the executive at the expense of Irish and Old English Catholic landowners. As more
Protestant settlers entered the region, any power which migrated back into the provinces was
allocated in their hands. This is best represented in the 1613-15 Irish Parliament, which,
despite the island’s population still being overwhelmingly Catholic, had a majority Protestant
makeup during all of its sessions.113 In less than a century, Catholics had gone from being
technically outlawed but essentially untouchable, to a persecuted political minority. The
stripping of Protestants, though most likely not on a conscious level for the rebels,
symbolically and violently returned Catholic landowners to the position of power which had,
historically speaking, abruptly been taken from them. The humiliation of Protestant settlers
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through stripping, placing them in the helpless and powerless state which Ireland’s Catholics
had increasingly found themselves in during the seventeenth century, symbolically satisfied
rebel inclinations to return to the political and social climates of the fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries.
While the stripping of Protestants after capture, robbery, or the surrendering of a
stronghold is the most prevalent encounter between rebels and Protestant settlers, any history
of the rebellion could be considered whitewashed without discussion of the murders that took
place. The frequency of murders during the rebellion is surely the hardest thing to gauge in
the entire episode and probably why many historians have skirted the issue. Murders of
Protestants by Catholics, often graphically depicted, were the chief tool used by English
commentators to paint the Catholic rebels as little more than bloodthirsty religious warriors.
Most of the literature which circulated in England in 1642-3 portrayed the rebellion as an
extension of the continental Thirty Years’ War, with the rebels’ chief goal being the
extermination of Protestantism – both in Ireland and the British Isles in general.114 Most
English readers believed these accounts of the rebellion—the vast majority of which were
written by Englishmen who had not even been to Ireland—confirming to many Englishmen
that the Irish, and Catholics in general, massacred Protestants out of an innate bloodlust.115
This general paranoia, as Joseph Cope has shown, manifested itself in all sorts of ways in
England. Certain stories told in pamphlets were consistent with—at times even borrowed
directly from—reports from France and the German states of massacres of Protestants. The
rebellion was often seen by Englishmen as part of a wider, Catholic-engineered plot against
Protestantism and England; even MPs in the House of Commons wondered aloud from where
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the next step in the great “Papist offensive” against England would come. Coastal cities like
Bristol, where the majority of Protestant refugees from Munster landed, were legitimately
worried over the impending Catholic invasion from Ireland which would be aided by the local
Catholic recusants. So prevalent was hysterical paranoia in these cities that the refugees were
held in suspicion; denizens feared the sheer number of refugees arriving from Ireland would
not only overwhelm the local economy, but mask Catholic agents who purportedly blended in
in an attempt to infiltrate England.116
With fears of Catholics so rampant in England, at levels higher than even the usual
hysterical responses by seventeenth-century English Protestants, it comes as little surprise that
the authenticity of estimates like Robert Maxwell’s 154,000 Protestant civilian casualties were
readily accepted. Furthermore, these attitudes among English Protestants are the reason why
murder numbers during the rebellion are nearly impossible to calculate; any murder by Catholics
would have been reported by a deponent as a fact whether they witnessed it or not. Second-hand
accounts of murders, however, cannot be immediately disregarded. Sometimes these reported
murders are corroborated in other depositions by eyewitnesses, while others are surely invented,
the result of a deponent relaying one or more of the wild rumors which circulated in the
countryside during the chaos of the early rebellion. A good example of this in county Kerry is
the deposition of William Dethick. It is clear, from the scope and nature of the deposition, that
most of Dethick’s account is pieced together from secondary and tertiary sources; Dethick
himself admits at one point “this the deponent saw not with his own eyes, but he dares vouch
truth for it, because he has heard it most confidently from the many mouths of Protestants, which
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are of good credit.”117 According to Dethick, Thomas Stack, a Protestant freeholder, was
working in his potato field around Christmas 1642, when he was accosted by four or five rebels
who brutally murdered him and threw his body into the river. Earlier in 1642, Dethick claims
that after the battle of Newtown, the McCartys rode into Killarney and rounded up sixteen “many
old and decrepit” Protestant men, women and children. These unfortunate souls were stripped,
“whipped up and down the town from one end to the other,” then promptly marched to a large
hole where all sixteen were buried alive.118 Neither of these stories is corroborated anywhere
else in the Kerry depositions and both are prime examples of not just the false rumor common in
Ireland at the time, but also the type of stories which fueled the pamphlets that circulating
England. Despite these radical (and to be frank, rather ridiculous) stories, Dethick does provide
a seemingly otherwise accurate account of the events at the siege of Tralee Castle.
Herein lies the paradox of attempting to estimate the number of murders that took place
anywhere in Ireland during the rebellion; the willingness of some Protestant deponents to report
any incident which came to mind, while serving its purpose in the contemporary literature,
undermines any attempt at estimation by modern historians. This is why even the most learned
historians can only make guesses based loosely on population estimates and why attempts to
garner exact numbers are misguided.119
For these reasons, both here and later for counties Clare and Limerick, I will not attempt
to ascertain any figures of the dead. When considering how little we know of the populations of
these remote counties, any attempts at a scholarly estimate would be little more than a guess.
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What then, can we discover from the murders recorded by the Kerry deponents? First, contrary
to the contemporary literature of the time, murder was generally avoided by Sugan’s force and
the rebels in general. Murder was often the result of clashes between rebels and Protestant
settlers who were not willing to surrender their possessions and property peacefully. We have
accounts of several, perhaps as many as a dozen, Protestants who were murdered outside of
Tralee Castle during the siege. Little is known about these murders other than that they
occurred. These may have been the result of Protestants attempting to escape the siege who were
caught, or men who were attempting to break the siege.120 Margaret Percy’s husband and two
sons were murdered by Sugan’s men when they resisted the robbery of their cattle and goods on
their farm.121 The most detailed stories and estimates of murders come from deponents whose
information, as explained above, can be largely discounted. When considering only the accounts
of murder in county Kerry that are either corroborated, related by eyewitnesses, or simply
described in a less sensationalist manner, it is clear that the wanton murder of Protestants was not
the goal of Capt. Sugan’s rebel forces in Kerry. This does not mean that the rebels were opposed
to murder like it appears most Catholic priests were; if Protestant resistance, especially armed
resistance, was encountered by rebel forces then murder was the most often used recourse.
Indeed, if Protestants were willing to surrender their property, strongholds, goods, and often their
clothes, then they were generally allowed to remain physically unharmed, though often
encouraged to seek passage back to England where Protestantism could not influence the new,
Catholic Ireland.
The other major occurrence, which has already been discussed in passing as a part of the
stripping and murders, is robbery. Indeed, the robbery of deponents is universal; every single
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deponent in county Kerry relates what they were robbed of. Not only were all of the deponents
robbed, but nearly all of them were robbed of just about everything they possessed. Cattle,
horses, and other livestock were the most common items taken, most likely used to either feed or
arm the rebel forces. Many deponents also provide long lists of the goods and other sources of
wealth that were either physically or figuratively taken from them. A long account was provided
by Henry Gibbon:
Henry Gibbon…since or about, the tenth day of December last past, he was lost
and forcibly despoiled of his goods and chattels to the several values following,
603 pounds, 17 shillings. Of his horses, mares, colts, and one ox…of
merchantable wares, tobacco, hides, tallow and beef…of his book of accounts,
bills bonds and other writings were taken away by McFynnen and his brother
Florence [Capt. Sugan]…of his building, an iron works, in the river of
Kenmare…of his interest in his part of the lease of the iron works…of debt due to
the deponent for overseeing the ironworks. The sum of thirty pounds being due
upon McFynnen, and Daniel O’Sullivan Esquires both now in actual rebellion.122

Gibbon’s account is typical. Most deponents, even before recounting their own personal
experiences or the rumors they have heard about Catholic atrocities, are quick to enumerate—
down to the shilling—the exact amount of economic losses they incurred because of the
rebellion. Robberies, as can be seen in the list provided by Gibbon, were not restricted to the
items the rebels could use. “Merchantable wares” were also taken, presumably for either resale
by whichever rebel pillaged the goods or for personal use. Many deponents report having their
personal goods taken by both rebels acting individually and as part of Sugan’s larger band of
men. Robert Sharde had his hats and hatbands taken, along with his book of accounts.123 John
Loe’s boat and fishing nets were taken from him by rebels as well as all of his “household
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stuff.”124 Elizabeth Harris complained of having her family’s expensive plates and jewels taken
by the rebels, and Margery Blackwell told the deposition takers that all of her linen, woolen,
brass and pewter household wares were stolen.125 Robberies, much like the stripping of the
Protestant settlers, were ubiquitous. The settlers had all of their goods taken, whether they could
be feasibly used in the war effort or not. Many of the robberies, it seems, while originally
intending to gather supplies and arms for Sugan’s army, quickly deteriorated into indiscriminate
pillaging.
Most deponents were also quick to point out the land or leases they lost. Often, the
Protestant settlers were not physically forced off their land. As was the case with Henry
Gibbon’s iron works on the Kenmare River in southern Kerry, most deponents considered the
loss of the usage and/or profit from a lease or farm considerable enough to be delineated and its
potential revenue estimated and included in the list of the deponent’s losses. Many of these lost
properties were abandoned by settlers fleeing local rebel forces to take refuge in castles or seek
passage to England in port cities.
One of the more perplexing developments prevalent in county Kerry is the considerable
evidence of Protestant turncoats. John Abraham and his fellow deponents from Ballycarty Castle
claimed to have been told incorrectly by Robert Blenerhassett that a deal for the safety and
livelihood of the castle’s Protestant warders had been struck and that John Blenerhasset
repeatedly aided the rebels in their attempts to gain control of the countryside:126
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for that the said Robert Hasset, confessed to one of these deponents, Nicholas
Roberts, and others, that the truth was that he had made no quarter at all, but
referred him and all the English ward to Mr. Florence MacCarty’s [Capt. Sugan]
own breast. They also say that without any consent or fore knowledge of any of
the warders, when the castle was to be yielded up the said Robert Hasset called up
unto him all the warders, and caused them all to be disarmed, of those arms, who
were of their own proper goods, and so they were delivered up to the Irish ward,
himself being permitted to live within the Castle among the Irish…also they say
that in Captain John Hasset’s house that was situated within the Barn of the said
Castle, they have often served dinners of the prime Rebbells of that country to
come in and out, and eat and drink and be merry; also Florence MacCarty about
the latter end of August last Came to Captain John Hasset’s house within the said
Barn and Lay there one night and so went away again [the] next morning, the said
Florence being then a prime man at the siege of Tralee the said Capt John Hasset
was often seen to parlay with divers of the rebels, and letters past to and fro
betwixt them.127

Indeed, the Blenerhassets, though being English Protestant settlers, were often implicated as
acting in concert with Sugan’s rebel force in county Kerry. Josias White, who was robbed and
driven from his house near Ballycarty, claimed that he often saw Robert Blenerhasset grinding
corn for the rebels.128 Oddly enough, we do have a deposition from a member of the
Blenerhasset family: Arthur. The account, however, is entirely second-hand stories of the siege
at Tralee Castle and clashes between English forces and Lord Muskerry’s force in county Cork.
It seems likely that despite leaving a deposition, Arthur participated in his brothers’ duplicity.
Perhaps most damning is that the deposition is the only account from county Kerry which does
not list the goods and animals the deponent lost during the rebellion.
It was not only the Blenerhasset family that aided the rebels and/or switched allegiances
entirely; Abraham alone names more than a dozen men and families of county Kerry that had
become Catholic. John Williams, a Protestant warder of Tralee Castle, joined Sugan’s rebel
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force soon after the castle was given up.129 Gregory Dickeson names five Protestant men who
had “turned papist” since the beginning of the rebellion, forcing conversion upon their wives and
families as well. John Crosby, a gentleman freeholder, talked openly with the rebels and gave
food and drink to any rebels who “came within a bow shot of [his] land.”130 Perhaps the most
astonishing of these is John O’Connor who, despite having a typically Irish last name, was
purportedly a Protestant minister prior to the outbreak of rebellion.131 The list of men and
women who reportedly converted or reverted to Catholicism is surprisingly long in a sparsely
populated county like Kerry; nearly thirty individuals in all are documented in the depositions,
and several deponents claim in addition to those they named that many more in the county also
converted.
Perhaps the most interesting case comes from Edward Vauclier, a self-proclaimed British
Protestant gentleman from Tralee. Vauclier provides a harrowing account of his experience.
After being driven from his home in Tralee, he took refuge in Tralee Castle, where he assumed a
leadership role amongst the Protestant warders. Later, he and two others attempted to escape in
the summer of 1642. In doing so, he received fourteen wounds from rebel swords, and was shot
once in the right shoulder. He saved himself by jumping from a nearby rock into the river and
swimming a mile downstream.132
However, Daniel Spratt, a fellow warder of Tralee Castle, gives a very different account
of Vauclier’s actions. Vauclier, Spratt claims, was a rebel double agent of sorts. Vauclier, as a
principal gentleman of the town of Tralee, was well-respected by the local community and
subsequently the warders of the castle. In February, according to Spratt, before the castle had
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been besieged for a month, Vauclier rode to the gate of the castle and unsuccessfully attempted
to convince the warders to give themselves over to the rebel forces. Afterwards, rather than
taking up in the castle with the other warders as Vauclier claimed, Vauclier instead sent for his
wife, who herself was taking refuge in Tralee Castle, and led her out. Furthermore, Spratt
claimed that by the end of the siege when all of the deponents had “only quarter for life and one
suit of clothes a piece…Mr. Vauclier had no less than about eleven horse loads of goods.”133 In
1642, most Protestants who encountered rebels were robbed of everything; Spratt’s emphasis on
the sheer volume of goods Vauclier retained serves as yet another implication that he was
working for the rebels. Furthermore, Vauclier’s story of harrowing escape seems far-fetched at
best. It is far more likely that Vauclier had struck a deal for his family’s and his own livelihood,
probably under the condition that he attempt to persuade the warders of Tralee Castle to
surrender; alternatively, as a well-off gentleman, he may have paid the rebels off. Regardless of
how Vauclier secured his good standing with the rebels, it is yet another account of Protestants in
county Kerry joining, or acting in concert with, the Catholic rebel forces. This suggests that in
the dynamic landscape of Protestants and Catholics, English and Irish, confessional allegiance or
ethnic identity may have become more muddled by the beginning of the rebellion than has been
previously assumed. At the very least, it shows the opportunistic nature of most settlers.
Vauclier, after all, was an English Protestant of good standing in Tralee; his willingness to work
with the rebels whose goal was the creation of an officially Catholic state apparatus in Ireland is
surprising. As the Blenerhassets and other stories show, Protestants were not only willing to
work with the rebels, but convert or revert to Catholicism. This suggests several things about the
nature of seventeenth-century Irish society, and perhaps British religious awareness as well.
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First, it suggests that that Irish society, at the community level, was less intensely
religious, or, at the very least, less fervent in the adherence to the differences of Catholicism and
Anglican beliefs. At this point in Ireland, where Catholics and Protestants had coexisted for
nearly a century, confessional identification may have been merely a classification, a way to
identify one’s political allegiances instead of a matter of faith. Rather than caring about whether
one’s neighbor believed in transubstantiation, identifying someone as Catholic meant that they
recognized the Pope’s political authority—and likewise the right to determine religious
doctrine—rather than the King’s. Political, temporal allegiances are notoriously far more
flexible than religious and spiritual convictions. The plentiful evidence of Protestants willing to
change sides suggests that, in county Kerry at least, matters of religious doctrine were most
likely relatively unimportant; if converting—or pretending to convert—was what saved a British
settler’s family and livelihood, then they could live with consuming a few transubstantiated
Eucharists.
County Kerry was, in many ways, a unique province. One of the more isolated
provinces, with very few British settlers, it may be most surprising that even sixty some odd
depositions survive at all. The evidence that we do have portrays a dynamic relationship
between settler and native Irish Catholic. The fact that very few British Protestant settlers lived
in the county may have provided the impetus for so many to be willing to work with the
marauding Irishmen. Unlike in Ulster and eastern Leinster, the Irish rebels operated in a
somewhat orderly and humane fashion. Most of the robberies and both castle sieges were
conducted by Capt. Sugan or members of his force. It comes as no surprise then, that Stephen
Love tells us that it was Sugan who brought the laws from the Confederation of Kilkenny to
Kerry in November 1642, enacted a county council, and provided instructions for Kerry’s
50

gentleman and clergy to send men to the National Assembly.134 Furthermore, Sugan and other
Irish rebels began their operations far sooner than other historians have surmised. By December,
Kerry experienced its first robberies and attacks, and by January Sugan had assembled a rude
force with which he began to quell what few Protestant strongholds existed in the county. The
differences between county Kerry and its neighboring counties’ experience will become evident
as we turn to a far more Protestant-populated and violent account of the rebellion in county
Limerick.
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3 COUNTY CLARE
The only county in Munster west of the river Shannon, Clare is bordered by Limerick to
the south and east across the river and its only landed connection to the Irish isle is along its
northern border with Galway. In the northeast Lough Derg marks Clare’s boundary, before the
Shannon continues, headed south along Clare’s eastern border. As the Shannon divides both the
city and county of Limerick from Clare in the southeastern corner, it widens into a broad estuary,
which separates central and western Clare from counties Limerick and Kerry, respectively.
Surrounded by water on three sides, county Clare was and continues to be one of Ireland’s most
isolated areas. Edward MacLysaght, in his 1950 history of seventeenth-century Irish culture,
remarked that Clare was “admittedly an inaccessible region” and that “in the first decade of the
twentieth [century], many people…had never seen a motor car or even a railway train. There
was, in fact, no really essential difference between the daily life which I remember there as a boy
and that of the seventeenth century.”135
It comes as little surprise, then, that Clare’s rebellion is unique among the three counties
in this study. For starters, Clare was the only of the three counties in this study with a single
family who controlled most of the entire county. The O’Briens had been Kings of Thomond (a
common name for an area with roughly the same borders as present-day county Clare; in the
seventeenth century the two names were used interchangeably) since even before the twelfthcentury Norman conquest. Not only were the O’Briens the sole landowners in the county, many
family members, especially the patriarch, were converted Protestants. In 1543, Murrough
O’Brien was attracted to an alliance with the English crown through the surrender and regrant
policy, accepting the title Earl of Thomond, and the family later converted to Protestantism and
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adopted Anglicized customs and dress in order to curry even more favor with the English
crown’s administration in Dublin.136
These developments meant that the O’Brien lands in county Clare were largely secured
and safe from any proposed plantation of Munster. Donogh O’Brien, the fourth Earl of
Thomond, was continually trying to garner more income from his lands in Clare, and early in the
seventeenth century he even began purchasing lands across the Shannon in Limerick. In
addition, the O’Briens had planted several English and Dutch Protestant farming and artisanal
families in the county, forcing off Irish Catholic families who could not afford the higher rents.
Furthermore, these settlers the O’Brien family recruited often brought with them other families
eager for new farmland in western Ireland.137 Despite this, it should be noted, the county was
still overwhelmingly Irish and Catholic in its makeup – certainly more so than either Limerick or
Kerry.
This unique situation created a distinctive response to, and experience of, the rebellion.
Unlike in Kerry or Limerick where local leaders, often Catholic, joined the rebellion, the
rebellion was openly resisted by the sole authority in the county, Murrough O’Brien, the sixth
Earl of Thomond. O’Brien, who soon became Lord Inchiquin, played a key role as the chief
commander of Royalist forces in Munster until he declared for Parliament in 1644. In his own
holdings in Clare, Inchiquin did his utmost to protect his settlers and their goods, opening the
doors to his own castles for refuge. He often attempted to act as a mediating influence in his
lands, rather than being complicit in the violence perpetrated by his kinsmen. When four
hundred English and Dutch settlers of the area planned an armed resistance to the insurrection,
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Inchiquin enjoined them not to, saying “that course would further provoke and incense the Irish
to anger than otherwise.” During the siege of Limerick Castle in May 1642, Inchiquin again
endeavored to mollify tensions between the rebels and the besieged Protestants within. Inchiquin
attempted to persuade the Protestants within the castle to not attempt any bold, military action
against the rebels.138 Such action would have been folly, as there were mostly laymen, women
and children inside the castle, and by the spring of 1642 the rebel forces in the area had
organized themselves. Perhaps the best account of Inchiquin’s actions describes an episode after
the fall of Castle Clare, when “the right honorable” Inchiquin confronted his Catholic brother
Dermod O’Brien at Bunratty in front of John Smith, asking him “why they did commit such
rebellious and outrageous actions against the king’s subjects?”139
It is rather surprising that the most common name associated with rebel actions in Clare
is O’Brien. Indeed, Inchiquin’s brothers and cousins were undoubtedly leaders of the
insurrection in county Clare – Dermod, Daniel, and Turlough being the most commonly named.
The McNamara family is accused of perpetrating robberies and violence nearly as much as the
non-titled O’Briens, though it is unclear whether they gathered forces with the O’Briens or acted
of their own accord. How could it be then, that the rest of the O’Brien clan led a county-wide
rebellion that the most powerful member of the family took no part of? This question requires
further research into the seventeenth-century O’Brien clan, an area the depositions do not shed
much light on, though John Smith and others give evidence of numerous public arguments
between the Earl and some his relatives during the rebellion.
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This familial division is most likely in part due to the nature of the O’Brien family’s
anglicization and conversion to Protestantism; it was a political decision, one made to maintain
the security of O’Brien land and garner more influence with the English government. However,
the political advantages of adopting the reformed faith might not have carried any weight with
the personal religious leanings of the O’Briens. Despite their publicly Protestant associations,
the O’Briens did not “impose their beliefs upon their tenants, or hinder the missionary endeavors
of the Counter-Reformation clergy who worked within their lordship.” Indeed, “there was no
knowing what the disposition of the family towards Catholicism or Gaelic culture might be in the
future.”140 Therefore, other than the British and Dutch settlers that Inchiquin brought into the
county, the rest of the population was entirely Irish Catholic. In fact, there is evidence that local
proprietors in Clare attempted to remain aloof and protect only their lands from the Irish, similar
to the actions taken by many communities after the outbreak of war in England. Unfortunately,
those Catholics and Protestants who attempted this were soon swept up in the rebellion, for better
or worse respectively, by the sheer number of the county’s Irish Catholics committed to the rebel
cause.141
Despite concerted efforts made by Inchiquin to protect his Protestant tenants and their
goods, several deponents believe the Earl acted subversively. Edmund Mainwaring claimed,
admittedly with second-hand evidence, “since taking the castle and before [Inchiquin]
entertained with meat, drink, and lodging the said besiegers.”142 At the beginning of the
rebellion, according to Mainwaring, Inchiquin appointed Dermod O’Brien, Connor O’Brien, and
Donogh McNamara among others to be “Captains and Commanders within the county,” adding
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that he “pretended [it was] for the good of the County.”143 Many of these sentiments probably
arose because Inchiquin was the only O’Brien who did not revert to Catholicism and rebel.
Furthermore, Inchiquin’s own kinsmen most likely used their familial connections to further
their own goals. Dermod O’Brien, when disarming and robbing Urias Reade, told him it was
“by virtue of a warrant from the Earl of Thomond.”144 Two other tenants maintain his
complicity in the rebellion or, at the very least, his indifference. However, given the Earl’s vast
holdings of land in county Clare it seems counterintuitive that he would attack his own tenants.
In the shortest of depositions where only a date, a list of the land and goods the deponent was
deprived of, and the recognizable attackers are named, Thomond’s name is never included.
Furthermore, the evidence given in the depositions claiming Thomond acted in concert with the
rebels is either hearsay or based on the judgment of the deponent alone, who himself would most
likely have been resentful of his landlord’s untouched belongings while his own were plundered.
The fact that Inchiquin did not convert to Catholicism and eventually became the chief
commander of British forces in Munster did not stop the actions of his kinsmen. As the
argument witnessed by John Smith suggests, the rest of the O’Brien clan cared little about the
allegiances of their patriarch. Indeed, although we know that the Earl and his family had been
Protestant since the late sixteenth century, we have no information on the confessional
affiliations of any other O’Brien. As even the Earl himself did little to suppress Catholicism in
his domains, it is probable that he did not force Protestantism upon his kinsmen. Even if they
had outwardly converted, his kinsmen most likely retained Catholic practices and beliefs, and
possibly even attended Catholic mass which was still openly held in the county.
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Regardless of whether these O’Briens had reverted to Catholicism or remained Catholic
all along, they were doubtlessly the leaders of the Catholic rebellion in Clare. Dermod,
Turlough, Donnell, Daniel, Connor, Donogh are all named often by deponents as their chief
attackers, or the leaders of the agents of rebellion who had accosted them. John McNamara is
also frequently named, at times along with a member of the O’Brien clan but also often on his
own. John Meale’s family, for instance, was stripped and robbed in the middle of the night, 12
December 1641, by an estimated 200 men under the command of McNamara and Jeffrey
Burke.145 Meale’s three children later perished due to the cold, and he also names nearly a dozen
neighbors who were robbed by McNamara and Burke’s force. Juiane Pitch also recounted how
her goods and clothes were taken from them by John McNamara; her husband William and her
children were physically assaulted in the process. William Pitch died soon after.146 Regardless
of these seemingly isolated attacks, McNamara’s forces likely acted in concert with the forces
led by the various O’Briens, even if they were originally conceived separately. McNamara is
often named as one of the chief attackers at Ballyally, Banck, and Limerick Castles. The
individual attacks perpetrated only by the McNamara force were probably either raids foraging
for supplies for the larger force or occurred, as in Meale’s account, before a larger county-wide
force had been consolidated.
As in Kerry, direct connections to the wider rebellion are not present. However, the
justification given by various rebels for insurrection and their actual conduct is enough reason to
assume that the larger forces of rebels in Clare—the O’Briens especially—had contact and were
acting in concert with the wider, Ulster-begun rebellion. Despite their claims of Irish atrocities,
many Protestants personally were often unharmed if they were lucky enough to be attacked by
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rebel forces led by the O’Briens. Mary Young, for instance, admits that when Limerick Castle
was surrendered all of the English inside were given quarter.147 Giving quarter to English
Protestants was practiced by Phelim O’Neill’s forces in Ulster, and most depositions in Armagh
claim Protestants went unharmed, by O’Neill’s order, until after the Irish were defeated at
Lisnegarvey in late November, 1641. Moreover, as elsewhere in Munster the several hundred
rebels led by the O’Briens throughout the county often attacked castles, fortified positions that
would have been ignored if their insurrection had simply been a popular revolt. While there is
no explicit evidence linking the rebellions in Clare and Ulster, the nature of the rebellious
assaults led by the O’Briens in Clare and their motives for rising are indicative of their
connections to the wider rebellion, begun in Ulster.
In addition to their actions, the sentiments and statements of Clare’s most important
rebels echo those of O’Neill’s Ulster rising. Similar cries of rebelling in the King’s name or with
his commission are recounted by all the deponents who encounter rebels affiliated with the
O’Briens’ larger army: William Chambers who was held captive for eight days with the
Graneere family by a group of rebels was told by Teige O’Brien that the rebels had the King’s
seal to approve any rebellious actions; Dermod O’Brien reportedly told Inchiquin that the rebels
did not have to justify themselves as their actions were by the King’s direction; even Mary
Dannter was told by the rebels who accosted her family that the King was a frequent massgoer.148 Furthermore, near the beginning of the siege at Ballyally Castle, one of the rebels
approached the castle walls, telling the Protestants within that “[for] what they did they had a
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warrant from Sir Phelim O’Neill & likewise to banish all the Protestants out of the kingdom.”149
Though they most likely did not have any such document, for Sir Phelim O’Neill’s original
intentions were not to harm any Protestants within the country, it shows that even a minor rebel
in the O’Briens’ force was cognizant of the Ulster rising and later, once Ballyally was
surrendered to the rebels, Dermod O’Brien exclaimed to the defeated refugees that “what they
did was by directions from his majesty.”150 Perhaps the most representative of the rebels’ own
belief in these justifications comes from Urias Reade, who was told by Christopher O’Brien that
the rebels had Charles I’s commission for the insurrection “which if I had not certainly known
(quote he) I would never join with them.”151
That these justifications were often connected to the King’s fraudulent seal (or his
direction or actions), which Phelim O’Neill presented in order to legitimize the rebellion, is
reason enough to assume the larger forces present in Clare were connected with the rebellion.
Though, possibly due to its isolation and certainly due to the rumors present everywhere in
Ireland, Clare also exhibited some of the more colorful stories of rebel ideas about the rebellion’s
designs and its legitimacy. Donnell O’Brien, who imprisoned the Graneere family, was
apparently unaware of Irish claims for legitimacy under the British monarch when he cut a deal
with the family concerning their livestock:
Sir Donnell replying…my command was not to sell them or to make them away
& adding further quote he if ever the King of England recover the kingdom of
Ireland, the Englishman [Graneere] will have his cows again by law but if the
king of Ireland & the gentry of this same kingdom maintain the same, keep the
kingdom, be sure you will be answerable for the said cows towards the
maintenance of the Irish, our army.
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Obviously, Donnell O’Brien’s account is rife with factual and theoretical inaccuracies which
make his own personal view of the rebellion’s legitimacy hard to grasp: is he speaking of only
Charles I or is he insinuating Ireland has an altogether different King? Has Charles shed his title
of King of England to become the Catholic King of Ireland? A definite understanding from this
short account is impossible, but it is indicative of the complicated—and at times perverse—
justification which had permeated the ranks of the rebel forces. Others blamed Charles I rather
than claiming his approval; the rebels who robbed Francis Haselope told him that the rebellion
was the King’s fault, by “setting such mean & base governors to rule over” the Irish, naming
specifically Sir William Parsons and Sir Richard Bolton.152 Thomas Rountree had perhaps the
least substantiated story explained to him by John McNamara: the Queen had come to Ireland
with Charles I’s second son James, Duke of York, , in order to crown him as the Catholic King
of Ireland, and it was for their cause that the rebels had risen.153 While this array of reasons
given by lesser rebels portrays how disorganized the countryside became (something that will be
addressed later), the more common reasons given by forces led by the O’Briens—and their
targeting of castles and other Protestant strongholds—is reason enough to assume their affiliation
with the wider rebellion.
The size of O’Brien’s force itself is harder to grasp than forces in other counties. Unlike
in Kerry or Limerick, few deponents encountered the main rebel force as a whole; most
encountered bands of 60-100 men led by the various members of the O’Briens who robbed and
stripped the deponents. Indeed, the only time the force seems to have been together during the
early stages of the rebellion was at the siege of Ballyally Castle, and even then a large amount of
the rebel force dispersed in the middle of the siege, moving to Limerick where the siege of
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Limerick Castle was having greater success. 154 Those few depositions that do provide an
estimate put the rebel numbers around 1,000. This is probably an overestimate, a benchmark
number serving to portray that the O’Briens commanded far more than 100 or 200 soldiers. The
actual force was probably closer to 600-700. Despite Clare’s isolation and low population
density, this force—more than double what Sugan commanded in Kerry—is not all that
surprising; aside from what few settlers the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Earls of
Thomond had enticed to settle in Clare, the county was still overwhelmingly Irish Catholic.
The lone siege in the county that is detailed well and by multiple deponents took place at
Ballyally Castle. Many of the deponents in the Clare depositions were some of the 100-150 men,
women, and children who took shelter in the castle and were subsequently besieged for several
months.155 All of the major members of the O’Brien family mentioned above are named as the
chief attackers, along with several members of the McNamara family and other lesser rebels.156
Many Protestants fled to the castle after order in the county had broken down and after many had
been robbed—whether by O’Brien-led forces or individual Irishmen—of their household goods
and animals. They were besieged soon after, and by 4 February the main force of rebels arrived,
“with colors flying in a hostile & rebellious manner.”157 The siege proceeded in multiple stages.
Near the end of February a group of thirty Protestants armed themselves and attempted to break
the siege. Sallying forth from the front gates, the much smaller force of Protestants attacked the
rebel camp while the vast majority of the Irish force was observing Catholic mass, killing
approximately thirty rebels while only losing a handful of their own.158 However, the guerilla
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operation was doomed to failure, and the Protestants retreated back inside the castle once the
alarm had been raised in the rebel camp.
After that incident, a large portion of the rebel force departed to aid in the siege at
Limerick. 159 The smaller remaining force “built a fort and divers trenches” and prepared to
continue the siege indefinitely.160 After Castle Limerick fell in early June 1642, the force that
had left after the Protestant sallying force returned, with cannon from the siege at Limerick in
tow. With this they fired multiple shots against the castle walls. The rude cannon had little
effect on the sturdy walls of the castle, and, as at Tralee in Kerry, they only fired perhaps a dozen
shots.161 The “second siege,” as most of the deponents term the return of the large O’Brien-led
force, continued for several weeks after the Irish artillery fire.162
As spring and summer wore on, the situation for the Protestants inside the castle became
dire. Unable to leave the castle to collect fresh water or firewood, the Protestants “were driven
to that extremity and want of victuals that they were glad to eat the flesh of horses, dogs and also
to feed upon nettles docks & other weeds.”163 Indeed, at least thirty of the original refugees
perished during the siege, mainly the elderly and small children.164 Several, like Beatrice
Hepditch, left their remaining belongings in the castle and escaped through breaks in the siege
lines to look for shelter in the Irish countryside.165 When the castle finally did surrender around
the middle of September 1642, the Protestants were treated by the O’Brien-led army in similar
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fashion to those who surrendered to Sugan in Kerry.166 Their goods were stolen from them, but
no additional harm came to any of the Protestants who had managed to survive the siege.
The siege at Ballyally Castle and its result reveal just how organized the rebellious
O’Briens were; they managed to control a large force of approximately 700 Irish rebels. Though
the makeup of this army is not revealed by the depositions, as elsewhere the rebels likely had
little regular, martial experience. Moreover, the O’Briens’ forces were sustaining multiple sieges
at the same time. Their ability to leave a minor force at the siege at Ballyally and go with the
majority of their troops to aid the siege at Limerick for an extended period of time, without
lifting the first siege, speaks to a well-organized and disciplined militia – something not often
attributed to rebel forces early in the rebellion outside of those organized by Phelim O’Neill in
Ulster. The artillery, if only a couple of rude and ill-equipped cannon that were moved around
the countryside by O’Briens’ forces, indicate that the rebel forces under the control of the
O’Briens resembled an army more than a rag-tag group of rebels.
Furthermore, the treatment of the Protestants by O’Brien-led forces was not necessarily
violent. This was not always the case, for some Protestants died at the hands of the O’Brien
force; Urias Reade recounts how at the siege of Ballyally on 6 August 1642 several of the
castle’s caretakers who had fallen into rebel hands were barbarously murdered and their bodies
were “never suffered to be buried until the dogs & crows did pick & eat up their carcasses.”167
Despite these isolated incidents, the attacks on Protestants by the O’Briens and their forces were
not intended to be violent, whether or not they became so. All of the rebels in the depositions
were robbing Protestants; the difference in Clare lies in that the O’Briens’ rebels appropriated
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Protestant goods for the use of their army.168 Indeed, as Beatrice Hepditch’s account hints at, the
entire reason the Protestants were besieged at Ballyally Castle was because they were not willing
to give up their goods. Once she and several others resolved to leave their things behind, her
account suggests it took little effort to leave the castle without interference from the besieging
rebels.169 John Hawkins was told by Thomas Chamberlain, a corporal in the rebel army, “that
they (meaning the English) should carry no part of their goods away but must be seized upon &
kept for the maintenance of the kings army (meaning themselves).”170 While resistance to these
seizures resulted in minor skirmishes and at times the deaths of Protestants, it was not the
intention of these forces to kill English Protestants. Appropriation of goods for the use of the
rebel forces, not wanton killing of Protestants, was the reason the O’Brien armies accosted the
inhabitants.
Every accosted Protestant in the depositions begins his or her account by listing the items
that the rebels stole from them, usually including livestock, crops, household wares, clothing,
and at times arms and ammunition. Most deponents also include their land, which they were
either forced off or fled from, and the debts owed to them, whether by Irishmen who had joined
the rebellion or by men who had lost their lives in the unrest. Maximillian Graneere, for
example, claimed to be “desperate by reason that the debtors partly are murdered by the
Rebels.”171
Many of the deponents’ debtors were Irishmen. This was due in large part to the
plantation schemes which had supplanted many Irish farmers. Many were forced to migrate to
cities and become wage laborers or participate in various proto-industries, such as the ironworks
168

Deposition of John Hawkins (TCD, MS 829, 066r).
Deposition of Beatrice Hepditch, (TCD, MS 829, 073r).
170
Deposition of John Hawkins (TCD, MS 829, 066v).
171
Deposition of Maximillian Graneere (TCD, MS 829, 036r).
169

64

owned by Henry Gibbon related in the second chapter. Those who remained in their local area
were forced to become tenant farmers to the new, English landowners, paying rents that were
often double or triple what they had paid previously. These farmers would have also been
affected by the bad harvests that struck all of Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century.
As rents rose and yields diminished, farmers were forced to borrow not only money to buy
necessities like food and clothing, but draught animals to complete their harvests. Even Irish
Catholic nobles had become increasingly impoverished. In 1637, Dermot McFyneen Carty was
forced to mortgage his vast properties to the Earl of Cork in exchange for a cash loan. When it
became evident that Carty had no intention of paying Cork back, he rented the property out
exclusively to Protestants rather than the Irish tenants Carty had maintained.172 While this heavy
indebtedness among the Irish population did not spark the rebellion per se, it certainly created a
disgruntled, underprivileged majority with an interest in upending the establishment. Irishmen
had been increasingly disinherited as the English had begun planting Protestants more directly;
they had no vested interest in maintaining any semblance of authority. Furthermore, as
plantation policies had created a much larger indigent population than had previously existed in
Ireland, there were more men available who would have been willing to rebel. These factors
certainly swelled the ranks of rebel forces, and may account for the large force that quickly
assembled in a county as sparsely populated as Clare.
It should be noted that the picture painted of the rebels in Clare so far is strictly in
reference to those under the command of the main rebellious force led by the O’Brien clan.
Indeed, the popular insurrection against Protestants, apart from the main rebel force, was far
more violent and destructive in Clare than in either Kerry or Limerick. Looting by individuals or
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small bands of Irish often turned violent. Peeter Belson recounts how members of the
O’Flaherty family from Connacht stole all his goods and those of Peter Ward, before killing
Ward, his wife and his son.173 Thomas Mayden, himself stripped and robbed by rebels under
Daniel O’Brien’s agency, could not name any of the various men who had murdered his English
neighbors though they must surely have been common Irish Catholics.174 William Culliver’s
mother and daughter were beaten by several local rebels, and later died from their injuries.175
John Cookesson nameed several of his Protestant neighbors who were murdered by John
McThomas, whose name appears in Cookesson’s deposition alone. The dichotomy between the
popular rebellion and the O’Briens’ organized rebellion is best displayed in the deposition of
Neptune Blood. Blood himself had his cattle and some of his household goods and arms stolen
by a band of men led by Hugh O’Hagan and Teige O’Brien. No physical harm came to him but
Blood recounts a bevy of murders and their common Irish perpetrators from his surrounding
area. The entire Steele family was killed “in a most cruel & barbarous manner” by William oge
Nellane and James oge Cashy. Blood’s friends Margery Owens and Michael Hunt were likewise
killed by other individual Irishmen.176
The reasons given by the unorganized rebels for rebellion and robbery are also far more
base and hostile than those given by rebels affiliated with the O’Briens’ force. Redmond
Nollane, who appears sparingly in the Clare depositions, claimed “it will never be [again] that
any Englishmen (meaning the Protestants) shall enjoy a foot of land in this kingdom.”177 Rebels
such as Nollane and the O’Flahertys were not acting as part of the wider rebellion and they were
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probably not even interested in the establishment of a Catholic kingdom under the British
monarch; theirs were simply acts of opportunistic self-interest.
The frequency of popular violence in Clare is surprising: Munster is generally believed to
have experienced relatively little popular violence – at least in comparison to Ulster or Leinster.
Regardless, its occurrence is most likely due to an important societal dynamic present elsewhere
in Munster that Clare lacked: the presence of a substantial ethnically and religiously mixed
community. Though the Earls of Thomond had imported English and Dutch settlers to the
county, there had been no confiscation and redistribution of Irish Catholic land; indeed, since the
Irish Earls of Thomond had participated in the Surrender and Regrant program, as well as
outwardly converting to Protestantism, Clare remained outside the boundaries of the Munster
Plantation. Plantation in Clare was more of a rhetorical possibility than an actual threat, used to
ensure its principal lord continued to tow the government line.178 This meant that most Irishmen
of Clare were ignorant of Protestants or English in general. The opposite was true in Kerry and
Limerick; where plantation had created significant heterogeneous communities—or, at the very
least, created common contact between homogenous enclaves—Clare had none. The softening
of confessional lines and fervor associated with confessional identification never had the chance
to take place in Clare.
What news that reached them of political developments in the previous half-century was
most likely the product of rumor and hearsay. While it has been noted how prevalent rumor was
among the Protestant deponents and how it manifested itself in the accounts of the rebellion they
have given, it should also be stressed that spurious information and stories were just as prevalent
on the Irish Catholic side of the conflict. Moreover, stories of Protestant atrocities during the
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unrest or English Protestant usurpation of traditionally Irish land and power would have been
more readily believed in a county like Clare where few Irish dealt with Protestants on a daily
basis, if ever.
Like the images of bloodthirsty Irish Catholics drummed up in England by the likes of
Temple and others, the rumors spread about the Protestant counterattacks throughout Ireland
were largely fictional. They created an ugly caricature of Protestants. This image could be more
readily accepted by Irish Catholics in counties like Clare that had little or no interaction with
actual settlers. These readily believed stereotypes not only reinforced the residual resentment
toward English Protestants felt by the Irish Catholics in Clare, it also gave local Catholics in the
area a symbolic—though distorted—face of Ireland’s Protestant community and concrete
examples of aggression against the Irish Catholics that needed to be avenged.
Furthermore, as was evident in the examples of popular violence above, many of these
encounters were bloody. If someone in the deponent’s family did not lose their life to an
opportunistic, lone rebel, then their neighbor or neighbor’s spouse was often brutally beaten or
hanged. This wanton violence is in stark contrast to the conduct of the larger force led by the
O’Briens. Violence, rather than part and parcel of their attacks on local Protestants, was only a
threat; it was a tool the rebels could use to extort what they wanted, not an end goal. This is best
illustrated during the siege of Ballyally when the leaders of the refugee group within the castle
walked out to the rebel camp, presumably in an attempt to negotiate an end to the siege. Instead
of negotiations, the men were seized and imprisoned. Gallows were erected within sight of the
castle walls and rebels threatened to hang the men if Ballyally did not surrender. When it
became evident that not only were its warders not going to surrender the castle but that they also
were not willing to negotiate for the men’s lives, the refugee leaders were simply freed and
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returned to the castle.179 The violence perpetrated by rebels operating outside the larger rebellion
occurred not just because they had the opportunity—indeed, the O’Briens could easily have
executed Ballyally’s best men—but because the widespread caricatures of Protestant settlers had
dehumanized the Protestants in the county. In Clare, it was far too easy to murder someone who
was usurping your father’s and kinsmen’s land, political power, and natural rights; in Kerry,
murder was more difficult because you were often killing a neighbor, a business partner, or
perhaps even a friend.
Therefore in Clare, far more than in Kerry or Limerick, we see a marked disconnect
between the popular rebellion and the rebellion proper. While Kerry’s experience agrees with
commonly held notions that Munster saw little or no popular rebellion, as Catholic leaders like
Sugan, Muskerry, and Barry gained control of the province relatively quickly, Clare presents a
far different case. Though certainly not to the same extent as Ulster or eastern Leinster, county
Clare experienced a popular rebellion which has previously been undocumented. This popular
uprising occurred in part due to sheer opportunism among a poor, greatly indebted Irish Catholic
populace to be sure, but also because Clare lacked the interpersonal, interconfessional
relationships which grew out of the heterogeneous communities created by the Munster
plantation.
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4 COUNTY LIMERICK
The third and final county in this study, Limerick, is farther inland than the truly littoral
counties, Kerry and Clare. The river Shannon runs through the city of Limerick from east to
west, opening into a broad estuary west of the city, forming Limerick’s border with Clare before
emptying into the Atlantic. Although Kerry borders Limerick to the west, the county is centrally
located in Munster with Tipperary to the east and Cork to the south. The county more closely
resembled its inland neighbors than it did either Kerry or Clare; its farmland was more suitable to
sustainable agriculture, and its denizens were not subjected to the same harsh weather prevalent
on the Irish Atlantic coast.
Ethnically and religiously, Limerick was in a far different situation than Kerry or Clare
when rebellion broke out in October 1641. Limerick had a significantly higher concentration of
residual Protestants left over from the plantation era than either Kerry or Clare. Large tracts of
land were owned by the Earl of Cork, some of which he had planted with Protestants. These
inland lands were harder to attract settlers to than the coastal south, causing Limerick, despite
being well-settled with Protestants, to pale in comparison to the heavy settlements around Cork,
Youghal, Kinsale, and Waterford. The city of Limerick itself was heavily Protestant, though
many Old English Catholics still held considerable political sway; the mayor of Limerick was
either a Catholic or quickly converted to Catholicism after the outbreak of rebellion.180 In
addition, as in Cork where Protestant settlers tended to cluster around the most fertile farmland
along the Blackwater, Lee, and Bandon rivers, the densest Protestant settlement occurred along
the Maguire, west of Limerick itself. Throughout the rest of the county, British settlement was
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sparse at best, and Old English Catholics still controlled most of the land directly surrounding
Limerick itself: “there was a sequence of settler communities dominating particular localities
rather than a broad-spectrum settler society.”181
Limerick was still largely Irish Catholic, though it contained a larger population of Old
English Catholics than Kerry or Clare. This is most likely how the rebellion was able to spread
so quickly throughout Munster; the leadership of Old English Catholics had not been sufficiently
broken by the Munster plantation. When Catholic leaders in Limerick and Munster in general
first heard of a Catholic uprising they rose as well, often being able to gather large Catholic
forces ready to join the cause. The force these leaders amassed in Limerick was not only the
largest of the three counties in this study, but most likely the largest of the province.
The force, formally led by Colonel Garrett Barry and Donogh MacCarthy, Lord
Muskerry, was roughly 6,000 strong by August 1642, with some estimates placing it as high as
7,000. Garrett Barry was later appointed by the Confederacy as the commander of all Munster
forces.182 The large number of troops raised in such a short period of time is the result of two
factors. First, a radical proclamation by Munster’s ailing Lord President, William St. Leger, that
all Catholics were rebels, regardless of their actions, caused many Irish and Old English
Catholics to take up arms for the rebel cause. Furthermore, not long after St. Leger’s
announcement, the Catholic clergy in Ireland made a similarly polarizing statement: the rebellion
was, essentially, a conflict for the very souls of Catholics in Ireland; any Catholics who did not
actively help the cause—let alone assist the opposition—were excommunicated. Second, Barry,
a colonel in the Irish army that Wentworth had raised prior to his impeachment, was the
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commander of a force lodged on the southern coast at Kinsale, awaiting transportation to the
continent where they were to be dispatched for Spanish service.183 Soon after the rebellion broke
out, Barry received terse orders from St. Leger to disband his force.184 Instead, Barry led his
force inland, soon joining the rude forces raised by various Catholic leaders in Limerick and
Cork.
Barry’s force is not only exceptional in its size but also its makeup. In contrast to the
rebel forces raised in Kerry or Clare, it contained a large number of men who had formal military
training. Ireland, after all, really only came into contact with the continental military revolution
through its returning officers, as many had been formally trained in Flanders and/or Spain in the
latest military tactics and weaponry. In the north and east, men like Owen Roe O’Neill and
Thomas Preston returned to their ancestral homeland and formed the base from which the
Confederate military would be created.185 Through Barry, a professional soldier like those on the
continent, Munster was given a head start in this process. For instance, Barry introduced
Swedish battle formations to the Confederate army.186
The troop estimation given above of 6-7,000 is corroborated by most deponents and
contemporary observers of the force. Just less than half of this force was professional soldiers
who were under Barry’s command at Kinsale; there were originally 3,000 soldiers slated to leave
for Spain, and a small number deserted when they marched inland. The force’s burgeoning
numbers shortly after arriving in Limerick are testament to both the willingness of local Irish
Catholics to rebel, but also the fear of the consequences attempted neutrality would bear after the
statements made by both St. Leger and Irish Catholic priests. Furthermore, they may have been
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coerced to join by local Catholic leaders who themselves figure prominently in deponents’
accounts of this force in Munster.
Further evidence that over half of Barry’s force was an amalgamation of troops raised
locally in Limerick by Catholic leaders is that, until he was appointed by the Confederacy later in
1642 as chief commander of Irish forces in Munster, his troops could hardly be considered solely
under his control. Patrick Purcell, Oliver Stephenson, Viscount Muskerry, Lord Roch, and
various Fitzgeralds and Fitzedmonds are named as leaders of this force by deponents just as
often as Barry is. Despite Barry’s history as a professional soldier, these local magnates had
raised their own forces; while they were willing to work with other Irish Catholics with similar
goals, at this early, chaotic period in the rebellion with no firm central authority or leadership
apparatus established, they were likely unwilling to remit control entirely of the forces they had
raised. For example, long before Barry’s force made its way to Limerick, Oliver Stephenson had
raised 400-500 men and taken William Jarrett’s cattle around Christmas 1641.187 While
understandable, the presence of possibly up to a dozen leaders with their own objectives was
surely the cause of some headache as even after the consolidation of the Confederacy,
confederate commanders often bickered amongst themselves.188 This may have contributed to
the rebels’ defeat at the hands of Inchiquin’s royal forces in the only pre-confederation open field
battle in Munster, at Liscarroll, 25 August 1642.189
Nevertheless, the large force eliminated nearly every Protestant stronghold in county
Limerick, and by the end of summer 1642, the county was effectively under complete Catholic
control. As opposed to Kerry and Limerick, where we only have accounts of a small handful of
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castle sieges, in Limerick there are dozens. Most of these castles have similar experiences as
those we have already seen in Kerry and Clare: many Protestants left the countryside to take
refuge in the castle, the castle was besieged by an organized band of rebels working in concert
with the wider rebellion, and after a period of time the warders come to terms of surrender with
the besieging force. These durations varied: for example, castle Cullen withstood six months of
siege before it eventually surrendered, while Newcastle was given up by its chief warder
Anthony Hawkins after only three days.190 The results were often similar when the sieges ended:
terms were decided that guaranteed the Protestant warders their lives and their goods should they
promise to disperse and either seek passage back to England or not oppose the rebels militarily.
These agreements, as in Clare and Kerry, were often complied with in part by the rebels who let
the Protestant warders leave unharmed – but only after robbing them of all their goods, often
including stripping the clothes off their backs.
Where the castle sieges in Limerick differ from those we have already discussed is that
they were characteristically bloodier than in Clare or Kerry. John Stone was “barbarously
murdered” outside of Newcastle soon after the warders surrendered.191 After Kilfeyney Castle
was surrendered, three Irishmen and one Irish woman were hung by Edward Lacy, purportedly
because they had betrayed their people by converting to Protestantism.192 Two Protestants were
murdered as a warning outside of Castle Limerick, and the same tactic was used within sight of
Castle Pallis in early August, 1642.193 During the siege at Castle Limerick, an unlucky
Protestant lookout was shot out of the steeple in mid-May, dead before he hit the ground.194
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Perhaps the bloodiest scene that took place during a castle siege in Limerick was at
Castle Cullen. Besieged for several months by Barry’s main army, the situation within the castle
was dire: with many of the original 200 men, women and children dying of starvation and
dehydration, the warders had been forced to kill the horses in the castle’s stable and parse the
meat out among the remaining refugees. When these makeshift foodstuffs ran out, a company of
men took it upon themselves to organize a party to sally forth from the castle gates and forage
the crops from a nearby field that was ripe for harvest. How the rebel forces learned of the
excursion is unclear, but regardless of whether it was by a Protestant informant or simply that the
rebels expected a foraging expedition to the nearby field at some point, they were ready. The
rebels laid in wait in the fields and ambushed the party of Protestants who fled to the castle as
quickly as possible, though by the end of the attack twenty-nine Protestant men, women and
children laid dead outside the castle walls. They were left there by the rebels to rot, and
entreaties by the warders asking the rebels for permission to allow them to give their compatriots
a Christian burial were denied.195
Scenes such as this were not uncommon in Limerick while the rebels were clearing out
Protestant castles and strongholds. Irish Catholic rebels in Limerick showed a much higher level
of animosity toward the Protestant refugees; the nature of its rebellion—both proper and
popular—was far more consistent with the rest Ireland than with either Clare or Kerry. This may
be partially accounted for by the simple fact that in Limerick, unlike to the west and north,
Protestants were fighting back. Indeed, in Limerick we have this study’s only occurrences of
local Protestants banding together and creating counter-rebellious forces. John Cottrell, for
example, had his house near Newcastle burned down by the rebels in early April, and shortly
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thereafter he joined a small Protestant militia of one hundred men and forty horses. Led by the
Protestant landowner John Southwell, they encountered a rebel force on 12 April and, after an
initial exchange of volleys, pursued them a few miles to the local grange where Southwell was
killed by a rebel salvo.196
An incredibly harrowing account of a Protestant company is given by James Keene and
Thomas Dayly. In early March, Keene and Dayly had joined a local company of Protestant
musketeers led by a professional soldier, Captain Charles Price. After journeying south to an
army garrison in Mallow in county Cork to resupply, the musketeers were ambushed by a rebel
force as they returned to their station north of Limerick. The company was annihilated by the
rebel fire, with only a handful of Protestant soldiers escaping into a nearby abandoned house.
The rebels initially attempted to burn the house down, but the Protestant volleys from inside cut
down so many that the Irish settled with firing on the house from afar. Keene and Dayly
maintained a firing position in the loft of the house for over two hours, exchanging shots with the
rebels before they tired of the attack and left. The ambushes portrayed in these attacks were
characteristic of rebel and seventeenth-century Irish tactics in general. They occurred
everywhere; a little more than a week after Keene and Dayly’s perilous experience at the house
in between Limerick and Mallow, they attacked a company of Irishmen who were hiding in the
tall grass outside of Mitchelstowne Castle, presumably lying in wait to ambush any Protestant
warders attempting an escape.197
These proactive Protestant assaults on rebels in county Limerick would surely have raised
the ire of Catholic rebels; soldiers and commanders alike would have been less inclined to offer
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sanctuary to Protestant refugees leaving a surrendered castle after they had just been attacked by
the refugees’ kinsmen. English policy did not help matters. Possibly spurring the popular
violence against common English and Protestants alike, English army forces like those joined by
Dayly and Keene adopted a strict stance against the insurrectionaries. Seen by the English
Crown and Parliament as treasonous rebels, no prisoners were taken; “all Irish [were] put to the
sword.”198 Regardless of the charters signed between Barry’s force and surrendering Protestants,
the warders were often treated roughly—certainly rougher than in Kerry—and most surrenders
were accompanied by a handful of Protestants being hanged by the soldiers.
The larger population—both Protestant and Catholic—of Limerick in comparison to
Kerry and Clare not only meant there were more castles for the rebels to attack, but also that
there were more forces, and the chaotic story of Limerick the depositions tell is far more similar
to Ulster than to Limerick’s western neighbors. Unlike in Kerry, where Sugan’s force was the
only large band present, Limerick had at least one other large force roaming the countryside
during the initial period of rebellion. Edward Lacy, a local Catholic landowner, raised and
directed as many as 1,000 men and it is unclear whether he acted in concert with the large force
nominally led by Barry or even with the wider rebellion itself. Though Richard Harte heard
Lacy claim to have the King’s commission and declare that it was the Lord Justices (Borlase and
Parsons) and the Lord President of Munster (St. Leger) who were the actual rebels, Lacy’s
actions were far more violent and destructive than the other rebel forces in the area.199 Lacy and
his brother John were far more likely to pillage and murder indiscriminately than other rebels,
though this may just be a reflection of the county in general. For example, in March 1642 Lacy
hung two of William Weekes’ neighbors without claiming to have any justification. Lacy
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returned multiple times to rob Elizabeth Dowdall’s house; the final time he approached with all
1000 of his men and laid siege to her house. After she surrendered they pillaged everything they
could find before burning it to the ground.200 When John Arthur heard Lacy had hanged the man
whom he had loaned out several milking cows to, Arthur approached Lacy in the hope of having
his cows returned. Lacy—portraying some uncharacteristic restraint—gruffly told Arthur to
leave and never approach Lacy again if he did not wish his children to become orphans.201
Though Lacy was most likely acting in the name of the rebellion proper, he is perhaps
best viewed as an example of the differences between county Limerick and county Kerry.
Whereas Kerry experienced very little popular violence, the Limerick depositions are rife with
individuals acts of robbery and violence perpetrated against Protestants. For example, William
Ridgley encountered a band of about forty local Irishmen on 8 December 1641. He recognized
his neighbor Art McCahir as the leader of the band, and having already been robbed once on All
Saints’ Day (1 November), Ridgley fled. He watched from afar as McCahir and the local rebels
stole everything of value from Ridgley’s house while shooting at it indiscriminately.202 A
member of the O’Kelly family from Clare crossed the Shannon in the summer of 1642 and stole
Symon Colston’s boats.203 Richard Winter, on his way to his fields, was approached by four
strangers who assaulted him and took his clothes.204 Thomas MacGibbon entered the city of
Limerick in mid-February and hung four Protestants as a warning to those who remained.205 In
mid-April MacGibbon burned Richard Baxenden’s mill in Mohowny and many of the houses in
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that settlement.206 Nicholas O’Helahan justified robbing Ann Eaton’s family by telling her that
he had been ordered by both the Pope and the Queen to rob all Englishmen he could find. Her
mother died five weeks later from wounds after being hit with a rock in the altercation.207 These
occurrences are just a few of the numerous accounts in Limerick of individual Irishmen acting of
their own accord, using the rebellion as justification to rob and kill Protestants. The prevalence
of popular unrest in Limerick tends to be understated. While it surely did not experience the
same, horrific levels of atrocities as Ulster or Leinster (the forced drowning of 100-plus
Protestants at the River Bann, for instance), these examples show clearly that robberies and acts
of violence apart from those perpetrated by rebel forces occurred with some frequency in
Limerick.
This can be accounted for through the nature of seventeenth-century society in Limerick.
Limerick had large settlements of Protestants. While areas around Cork, Youghal, and
Waterford were certainly more populated with Protestants than Limerick, its neighbors Kerry
and Clare paled in comparison.208 Settlement was particularly large in the city of Limerick itself,
though, it should be mentioned, its mayor Dominick Fanning joined forces with Barry and the
other Catholic nobles in the county soon after the rebellion began.209 Furthermore, the
settlements in Limerick adhered more strictly to guidelines and goals of plantation policy. Most
of the lands that were planted in Limerick were bought by the Earl of Cork when the original
adventurer defaulted. Under Cork’s stewardship, these settlements became the closest example
of the homogenous, Protestant-only communities the Crown had intended them to be. Through
making contact with English and Dutch artisans and farmers, often at the port of Limerick, Cork
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actively recruited Protestant families to settle on his plantation land outside of Limerick. Cork
influenced the city of Limerick as well, as he encouraged urban development in order to foster
public order and create a safe environment that would entice more English to settle in the area.
Moreover, as Lord Inchiquin, the Irish Protestant Earl of Thomond in Clare, expanded his
landholdings across the Shannon and into Clare, he imitated Cork’s successful practices.210
While these policies created the homogenous Protestant communities that the Crown had
originally intended when it began the plantation policy, their existence adversely affected
Protestant well-being during the uprising. Without the commingling of Protestant and Catholic
enclaves as there had been in Kerry, the rigid, religious-based classifications did not have the
same opportunity to soften. Furthermore, an increased level of plantation in Munster would have
forced a larger percentage of Irishmen—in an already well-populated county—off their land in
place of those Protestant communities. These Irishmen would have rightfully characterized their
ancestral land’s usurpers by their Protestantism, fostering sectarian animosity already prevalent
in European society that had no chance of being quelled by the bonds of personal relationships
due to the replacing community’s closed nature.
In this light, it is perhaps most surprising that here we also find many conversions to
Catholicism amongst the Protestant population. The evidence suggests, however, that these may
have been less willing converts than those found in county Kerry. Unlike the accounts given of
the Blenerhassets or Edward Vauclier, there are no accounts of Protestants converting and then
actively aiding the rebel forces. Some deponents are able to give names of those who had
converted: John Massey claims his neighbor William Langford was now Catholic; Henry Briggs
asserted that the Evans family of Ballingarry freely converted; Faith Grady even mentioned that
210
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her local Justice of the Peace converted.211 Many of the conversions noted in Limerick,
however, are non-descript, such as Elizabeth Lodge who simply relates that “divers other”
Protestants have converted to Catholicism.212 Limerick is unique in that, rather than a series of
willing Protestants becoming Catholic being related, many of the conversions in Limerick seem
to have been forced. John Cooke was robbed shortly after the rebellion began in late October by
a company of seventy-five rebels under the command of Conn O’Rourke. O’Rourke offered to
return Cooke’s goods if he promised to start going to mass with his fellow Catholics. When
Cooke questioned O’Rourke on the alternatives, O’Rourke threatened to kill Cooke if he refused
the offer. Excusing his actions to the record taker by citing his children, Cooke admitted to
converting to Catholicism on the spot, though he later regretted the decision.213 Ann Eaton, who
was accused by a separate deponent of converting, admitted that the same O’Helahan who stole
her goods and struck her mother with the eventually fatal blow told her that if she went to mass
with him no harm would come to her. Eaton converted, staking her very survival on her
willingness to comply with the request.214
Many of these coerced conversions were perpetrated by common Irishmen unassociated
with the rebellion proper or any of the larger forces in the county. While the disenfranchisement
and loss of political authority was what Irish Catholic landowners were rising against, common
rebels likely viewed the rebellion in a more confessional light; popular rebels characterized
themselves and the purposes of the rebellion as both Catholic and Irish. The sought-after
reorientation of the social order meant that the newcomers—Protestant settlers—were fair game.
Their being the object of attack had little to do with their religious practices and more to do with
211
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the political and social authority they had usurped. Furthermore, as societal lines became more
“religious confession was becoming the easiest way to sort the population” for both the English
and Irish governments and the Irish population in general.215 This classification system,
solidifed after Confederation in 1642, is perhaps best exemplified by the murder of Irish
Protestants by Irish Catholics at Kilfeyney. In turn, English Protestants often viewed Catholics
as guilty simply by being Catholic, regardless of whether they personally committed any acts of
violence or robbery.216 These views, coupled with the Protestant counter-rebellion and the lack
of heterogeneous societies, likely spurred the violence and vitriol present in Limerick’s rebellion.
Kerry and Clare are largely the exceptions to the rule; the chaotic, bloody rebellion in county
Limerick is far more consistent with the rest of the island’s experience.
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EPILOGUE
By September 1642, Ormond controlled a large army of approximately 35,000 troops in
Ireland. Considering these figures and the relative disarray that still existed in the countryside,
Scott Wheeler has posited that had civil war not broken out in England, the insurrection in
Ireland could have been easily suppressed as rebellions often had in the last century.217 While
this supposition is accurate when considering Ireland as a whole, the nuanced situation in
western Munster—which this study has shown often shifted even town to town—shows the
unique experience of each region during the opening periods of rebellion. While its uniqueness
has been acknowledged by modern scholars, too often generalizations about the area have been
made using information from (admittedly much more vibrant) counties near the MunsterLeinster border like Tipperary, and especially Waterford. Though it is certainly important to
understand the rebellion in western Munster as part of a general insurrection that quickly
enveloped the entire island, recognizing sieges and robberies as essentially local events—
inherently subject to local history and personal attitudes—enriches not only the story of the
rebellion, but our understanding of how Irish society functioned directly prior to this tumultuous
period.
The importance of understanding each locality on its own terms is certainly more crucial
for Clare and Kerry than it is for Limerick. Though certain similarities between the three
counties exist (e.g., the conduct of rebel leaders after a castle siege had been broken, the
haphazard movements and conduct of most rebel forces, Clare and Limerick both saw
considerable popular violence), the nature of Limerick’s rebellion more closely resembles its
eastern neighbors than it does Clare or Kerry. In this study Limerick has largely been presented
217
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not only as a counterweight to the other two counties, but as a representation of the rebellion in
Munster as it is often portrayed. Clare and Kerry both present special cases which have been
routinely ignored in rebellion studies. While this may be because of a general paucity of sources
(Clare and Kerry combined produced fewer depositions than Limerick, and barely one-fifth what
Cork produced), they have also been ignored because they generally do not fit the same mold as
other counties in Munster.
Kerry especially seems to have had a very different experience altogether; popular
violence in the county was virtually non-existent. Even the sieges of Protestant castles were
more orderly than anywhere else in Munster or Ireland. This is perhaps best exemplified at
Tralee when Sugan’s rebels built gallows, and threatened to hang the Protestant men who had
left the castle intending to negotiate. When the Protestant warders refused to negotiate for the
men’s lives, the rebels released the leaders, allowing them to rejoin their compatriots inside the
castle walls. In contrast, there are numerous accounts of Lacy in Limerick attempting the same
leverage-wielding tactics, and being even happier to hang the warders afterwards. Clare also
presents its own special situation. Although the insurrection was led by Gaelic Irishmen as in
other counties, its chief Gaelic Irishman, Lord Inchiquin not only attempted to mollify
Protestant-Catholic tensions in the county but commanded most of Munster’s troops who were
fighting the very rebellion his kinsmen were propagating. Furthermore, Clare, which had by far
the smallest population of Protestants of any of the three counties in this study, actually showed a
higher incidence of popular violence than Kerry. The individual differences between all three
counties exemplify—in a time when historians are continually finding new ways to weave the
English, Scottish, and Irish experiences together—the importance of not losing an emphasis on
localism. Local conditions often drove seventeenth-century events: whether it was Edmund
84

Mainwaring fabricating stories of the Earl of Thomond’s collusion with the rebels, or Daniel
Spratt correctly accusing Edward Vauclier of the same thing.
The stripping of Protestants by Irish rebels exhibited everywhere in Ireland was a
symbolic inversion of the Protestant hierarchy which, while only nominally observed since
plantation began, was more rigidly implemented in the 1630s by Charles I and the Protestantcontrolled Irish Parliament. These deep-seated resentments at the quickly consolidated
usurpation of traditionally Catholic authority in Ireland were what fueled the popular rebellion of
Clare and Limerick, and its absence in Kerry speaks to the heterogeneous societies that the
county developed. Indeed, in Kerry where Protestants and Catholics commingled on a regular
basis, previous relationships built between neighbors likely curbed Irish Catholic urges for
vengeance.
The very existence of these relationships fundamentally changes some of the basic
assumptions historians have made when approaching the period. Petty loans of cash, draught
animals, and livestock between neighboring Protestants and Catholics suggest a certain level of
trust across confessional and ethnic boundaries. Economic relationships like these were vital to
Irish commerce, whether it was between artisans and merchants in the cities or farmers in the
countryside. Plantation policy intended to create closed Protestant communities failed due to
basic economic needs and planters’ willingness to utilize the Irish Catholic tenant pool cheaply
available. In effect, this failing forced the two confessional communities to interact, in the
process humanizing Protestants in the eyes of Catholics and vice versa.
This study has also attempted to liberate the rebellion from its place in the religiouslybased propaganda of both the seventeenth century and today. The actions of Irish Catholic
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rebels and Protestant refugees in Clare, Limerick, and above all, Kerry support Canny’s
assertions that practical, political reasons, such as patronage and privilege, more than religious
ideology, spurred the rebellion.218 The rebellion, in its very essence, was a clash of cultures; that
religion, be it Protestant or Catholic, was considered by contemporaries and later historians alike
as the foundation of the two disparate societies is inconsequential to the aims of the partisans.219
These common assumptions and classifications are the result of both Protestant commentators
and twentieth-century Irish politics; after the 1641 rebellion, specifically because of John
Temple’s The Irish Rebellion (1646) which for centuries was accepted as the official account of
the insurrection, differentiations were no longer made between ethnic and religious groups.
Religious and ethnic classifications in British and Irish society collapsed: Irishness was
inherently Catholic, Britishness inherently Protestant. It was not William Seames’ Anglicanism
which was attacked in mid-January 1642, but the totality of his colonizing British identity.
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